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I. INTRODUCTION
These are our only remaining homelands. We have to protect 
hem. Eno gh s eno gh.  
Jodi Gillette, Fmr. White House Advisor on Native American 
Affairs.1 
The history of Indigenous2 resistance in the United States 
predates the establishment of the country itself. 3 Before the Thirteen 
Colonies even formed a government, Indigenous peoples of North 
America were pushing back against European whites infiltrating or 
outright conquering territories Indigenous people had resided in for 
centuries.4 Even during the height of Manifest Destiny, Indigenous 
people continued their rebellion against the federal government, 
through actions ranging from Indigenous protest of the laying in of 
railroads across the western United States5 to the American Indian 
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s.6 
The 2010s have marked an upsurge in Indigenous resistance 
and protest, particularly in the realm of environmental law. The 
#NoDAPL protests in North Dakota may be the most famous 
example of this phenomenon.7 Multiple protestors (who came to be 
 a  Wa e  P ec ) e a   fede a  c d  da , 
1 Divided Films, Mni Wiconi: The Stand at Standing Rock, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4FDuqYld8C8 
[https://perma.cc/K5Z7-2S9J]. 
2 It must be unequivocally stated that I am white, not Indigenous. I am 
deliberately choosing to use the term Indigenous to describe the First Peoples of 
the United States, rather than Indian, Native American, or Native, for both 
personal reasons and for purposes of consistency throughout the paper. In 
circumstances where the te  f Na e A e ca   I d a   be 
used ex. the Indian Civil Rights Act it is for ease of recognition by readers 
and academics. Similarly, by writing on this topic I am attempting to utilize the 
societal privilege I have been granted, as a white person who was able to attend 
both university and law school, to bring awareness to issues that may not 
otherwise be discussed. I do not wish to be credited for the fantastic work of 
Indigenous environmental protestors around the world, and if anything in this 
paper is offensive or egregious to anyone, please feel free to contact me at 
alixbruce@protonmail.com. 
3 See generally ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES  HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES (2014). 
4 See id. 
5 DINA GILIO-WHITAKER, AS LONG AS GRASS GROWS 58 (2019). 
6 See generally DENNIS BANKS WITH RICHARD ERDOES, OJIBWA WARRIOR:
DENNIS BANKS AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (2004); see 
generally VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS (1969).  
7 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 3-10. 
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including Red Fawn Fallis, who was sentenced to almost five years 
of prison time for possession of a weapon brought into the Water 
Protector camp by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.8 
Similar examples of resistance include Indigenous defenders of 
Bears Ears Monument in Utah; Standing Rock veterans protesting 
the Line 5 installation in Michigan in Camp Anishinaabek; Water 
P ec   L a a a  he L ea  E  V e ( Wa e   L fe ) ca  
standing against the Bayou Bridge Pipeline; and Society of Native 
Nations members protesting the installation of the Kinder Morgan 
Pipeline in San Antonio, Texas.9 Indigenous peoples have been and 
continue to be on the front lines of peaceful protest in the United 
States.  
However, in the wake of these massive protests, state 
governments across the nation have begun to enact laws that curtail 
or outright prohibit protest. At the time of this writing, more than 
100 bills have been considered or enacted across the United States, 
with nine states enshrining anti-protest edicts into law: Indiana, 
Louisiana, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.10 Other states, including 
Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, North and South Carolina, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania, have anti-protest legislation up for consideration. 
These proposed laws range in topic from imposing mandatory 
 
8 Will Parrish, An Activist Stands Accused of Firing a Gun at Standing Rock. It 
Belonged to Her Lover An FBI Informant., THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 11, 2017, 
4:11 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/12/11/standing-rock-dakota-access-
pipeline-fbi-informant-red-fawn-fallis/ [https://perma.cc/J4L4-GL9M].  
9 Joe Fox et al., What Remains of Bears Ears, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/bears-
ears/?utm_term=.cc5e5fd1d014 [https://perma.cc/7ZPH-L23D]; Gina Kaufman 
and Robert Allen, Standing Rock protestors now protesting Line 5 pipeline, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 11, 2018, 7:17 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/08/11/standing-rock-
protesters-line-5-pipeline/968405002/ [https://perma.cc/BPA8-PGEA]; Levi 
Rickert, Four Water Protectors Arrested at Bayou Bridge Pipeline Construction 
Site, NATIVE NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://nativenewsonline.net/currents/four-water-protectors-arrested-at-bayou-
bridge-pipeline-construction-site/ [https://perma.cc/NW8S-YLUW]; Frank 
Hopper, Kill he bill! Sa e he land!  Na i e pro ec ors disr p  Te as 









sanctions for campus protestors (SB 33, North Carolina) to 
expanding the definition of a riot (AB 2853, New Jersey), expanding 
the definition for unlawful assembly (HB 288, Missouri), or 
prohibiting masked demonstrations (HD 2639, Massachusetts).11  
The most troubling of these anti-protest laws are those that 
penalize protests near gas and oil pipelines.12 Frequently described 
b  a e eg a e  a  e a e  f  e  ea  c ca  
f a c e,  he e a  c a e e  ea  ga    
pipelines, including those under construction at the time of the 
protest.13 Although these laws may not expressly target Indigenous 
peoples, the implications of the laws inevitably prevent Indigenous 
peoples from exercising their First Amendment Rights.  
Part I of this paper provides a timeline of protests and First 
Amendment law in the United States, describing the First 
A e d e  de e e  a d c ec   he D e P ce  
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its progression to the 
current era. Part II examines the application and provision of civil 
rights to Indigenous communities in the United States, including the 
application of First Amendment rights to Indigenous peoples. Part 
III describes the #NoDAPL protests in North Dakota, their political 
impact, and the resulting wave of anti-protest laws. Part III will also 
provide an overview of anti-protest laws in five states, focusing 
specifically on laws being enacted or debated in North and South 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas, as well as the newest 
ed fede a  a  ec g aga  c ca  f a c e  
destruction. Part IV links these anti-protest laws to the long history 
of chilling of Indigenous free speech and stifling of Indigenous civil 
rights in the United States, particularly by exploring the way each 
law violates the First Amendment. Part V considers the 
consequences of these anti-protest laws not only on Indigenous 
peoples, but on the United States as a whole. Finally, Part VI 
provides recommendations on how the United States can repair 
these issues and perhaps move forward more in line with the goals 
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
 
11 US Protest Law Tracker, INT L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., 
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/ [https://perma.cc/HZE7-5UGN]. 
12 US Protest Law Tracker, Pending Bills, INT L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., 
.http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/?location=&status=pending&issue=&d
ate=&type=legislative [https://perma.cc/YN7Q-ZLE5]. 
13 See American Legislative Exchange Council, Critical Infrastructure 




Pe e  (he eaf e  UNDRIP ).   
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES  
 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
a e  ha : C g e  ha  a e  a  e ec g a  e ab h e  
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
f g e a ce . 14 Legal applications of the First Amendment are 
varied, with the interpretations of the various clauses by the 
Supreme Court changing depending on era and cultural norms. To 
better understand how critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws 
violate the First Amendment rights of Indigenous peoples, the 
applicable case law of both freedom of speech and freedom of 
association must be explored.  
 
Freedom of Speech 
 
The h  f he S e e C  e a a  f he F  
A e d e  da e  bac  a  e fec   he F  A e d e  
drafting and addition to the U.S. Constitution in 1791; the 
application of First Amendment protections continue to be a highly 
litigated area of law.15 When it comes to freedom of expression, 
which encompasses both freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press (only tangentially relevant here), the Supreme Court has 
established, edited, and transformed a series of tests to apply to state 
or federal laws which seek to regulate free speech to determine their 
constitutionality. The clear and present danger test, established in 
1941 with Thornhill v. Alabama16 and ending in 1951 with Dennis 
v. United States17, attempted to put forward the idea that First 
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression could only 
be ab dged f he e a  [a] c ea  a d e e  da ge  f de c  
of right or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of 
 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
15 American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 139 S.Ct. 2067, 204 L.Ed.2d 
452 (2019); Bill of Rights (1791), OUR DOCUMENTS, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=13 
[https://perma.cc/4VDK-6XMZ]. 
16 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
17 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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the peace that can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every 
e  . . . 18 Under this rule, free speech would be protected by the 
courts so long as the exercise of that right to free speech did not 
endanger, harm, or result in endangering or harming people or 
property. As presented in Thornhill, a case dealing with anti-
picketing laws, so long as people or property (like a pipeline) were 
not harmed in a person exercising their right to free speech, that free 
speech was legal and protected.19  
However, the clear and present danger test was transformed 
b  J ce F a f e  c c e ce  Dennis. Rather than 
continue using the clear and present danger test, Justice 
F a f e  c c e ce gge ed he e e a  f a 
balancing test one which required courts to examine laws or cases 
that might violate free speech by considering whethe  he g a  
f he e ,  d c ed b   bab , f e  ch a  
f f ee eech a   ece a   a d he da ge . 20   
J ce F a f e  ba a c g e  a  ed h gh  he 
1950s and 1960s, until the lines began to blur because the Supreme 
Court used the balancing test in some cases21 but not others.22 The 
test slowly transformed into a concept of examining vagueness or 
he e b ead h  f a a  a he  ha   ba a c g, a  Ch ef 
J dge Lea ed Ha d e, he g a  f he e  h he 
infringement on free speech.23 In 1997, the Supreme Court in Reno 
v. American Civil Liberties Union (he eaf e  Reno ) a ed ha  a  
e b ad a  gh  be c ed f  c a  b  e e g 
[a] term . . . pursuant to its se e ab  c a e. 24 In Virginia v. Hicks 
(he eaf e  Hicks ), he S e e C  de e ed ha  a a e 
h ch a h ed he R ch d ce  e e ce  a  
e  ac g a eg a e b e   c a  e  f  be g 
on the property of a low income housing development in Richmond, 
Virginia was not overbroad.25 The Supreme Court in Hicks stated 
that:  
The h g ha  a a  he  a b a a  
 
18 Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 105. 
19 Id.  
20 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950), cited in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 510.  
21See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 
(1961). 
22See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).  
23 183 F.2d at 212.  
24 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997).  
25 539 U.S. 113, 113 (2003).  
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a  f ec ed f ee eech, dged  e a  
 he a e  a  eg a e ee ,  ff ce   
invalidate all e f ce e  f ha  a ,  a d 
unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation 
so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or 
deterrence to constitutionally protected 
e e . 26  
 
The Supreme Court de  h  e ed   f c ce  ha  he 
h ea  f e f ce e  f a  e b ad a  a  de e   ch  
constitutionally protected speech especially when the overbroad 
a e e  c a  a c . 27 This does not mean that a law 
should not be enforced so long as it has a legitimate purpose in 
a a g c ehe e c  e  ha f , c a  
ec ed c d c . 28 However, if a law, federal or state, 
sufficiently chills free speech to the point where people will choose 
not to exercise that free speech because of potential criminal 
consequences, then that law should be severed, amended, or 
invalidated as it may become necessary.29 
The Supreme Court will also frequently examine whether a 
law is sufficiently precise to ensure that any action taken in the 
course of the exercise of free speech may be potentially criminal 
conduct.30 Specifically in regards to public demonstrations or 
protests, vagueness can be combined with the examination of a 
statute as being potentially overbroad.31 National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People v. Button will be discussed further 
 
26 Id. at 119 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (c g B ad c  . O ah a, 413 U.S. a  615) (f g h [f]  
there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine. . . [t]o 
ensure that these costs do not swallow the social benefits of declaring a law 
e b ad,  e ha e ed ha  a a  a ca   ec ed eech be 
b a a ,     a  ab e e e, b  a  e a e  he c e f he 
a  a  eg a e a ca  . . . bef e a g he g ed c e  
f e b ead h a da , 119-120). 
30 See Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Village of Hoffman 
Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).   
31 Na  A  f  Ad a ce e  f C ed Pe e (NAACP) . B , 371 
U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (examining the constitutionality of Chapter 33 of the 
V g a Ac  f A e b , h ch h b ed c a  f ega  b e  b  a 
e   ca e   c de,  he def [ ] . . . a  age  f  a  d d a  
or organization which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is 
 a a  a d  h ch  ha   ec a  gh   ab ,  h ch he C  
held unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
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below in terms of freedom of association, but it provides the most 
c ge  de c  f he S e e C  d c e ega d g 
vagueness or overbreadth. According to the Supreme Court, the 
consequences of a law which is either overly vague or overly broad 
can be immense; in NAACP v. Button, Justice Brennan states:  
 
The objectionable quality of vagueness and 
overbreadth does not depend on absence of fair 
notice . . . but upon the danger of tolerating, in the 
area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of 
a penal statute susceptible to sweeping and improper 
application. These freedoms are delicate and 
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious . . . 
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently 
as the actual application of sanctions.32 
 
The use of vague language or overbreadth in a statute limiting free 
speech is not limited, like in other constitutional questions, to 
whether the statute provides fair notice of whether a criminal act 
could be committed. Rather, as per Justice Brennan, the overbreadth 
or vagueness of the statute itself could result in the criminalization 
of protected speech.  
Perhaps one of the most significant cases in the context of 
this issue is Brandenburg v. Ohio, decided by the Supreme Court in 
1969.33 The defendant in Brandenburg, a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan in Ohio, had been convicted under the Ohio Criminal 
S d ca  Ac , h ch c a ed he ad ca [ g] he d , 
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful 
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
ca  ef . 34 After inviting a television crew to attend a group 
ee g, he defe da  a ed a  e  ha   b e that 
he e gh  ha e  be e e e gea ce [ c] a e   he 
President, Congress, and the Supreme Court for recent decisions 
during the Civil Rights era. 35 The Oh  S e e C  
aff a  f he a  c c  a  e ed b  he S e e 




33 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).  
34 Id. at 444-45 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13).  
35 Id. at 446.  
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[We] have fashioned the principle that the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech . . . do not 
permit a state to forbid or proscribe the advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action. As we said in Noto v. United 
States, he e e ab ac  each g f the moral 
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force 
and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for 
e  ac  a d ee g   ch ac .  
[Citations omitted.] A statute which fails to draw this 
distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the 
freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation 
speech which our Constitution has immunized from 
governmental control. [Citations omitted.]36 
 
The Supreme Court continued by stating that the Ohio Criminal 
Syndicalism Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as 
   h e e ad cac  a d  f b d,  a  f 
criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the 
de c bed e f ac . 37 The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act had 
c a ed he ad cac  f e ce a  a ea  f acc h g 
d a   ca  ef . 38  
It is apropos to mention that while the intent of the lower 
courts in this case was to convict a Klansman who had been 
advocating the overthrow of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches, the end result was unconstitutional.39 Thus, state laws 
which interfere with the freedom of speech, even if that speech 
advocates use of force or violation of the law, are unconstitutional 
when that speech does not incite the use of force or breaking the 
law.40 To regulate free speech, a legislature must weigh the intent of 
the speaker, the likelihood of violence being the result of the speech, 
or the actual imminence of the possible violence which are critical 
in regulating free speech. Laws which infringe on these things 
 
36 Id. at 447-48.  
37 Id. at 449.   
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 446, 449. 
40 Id. at 449. 
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without just cause are unconstitutional.41    
 
Freedom of Association  
 
Freedom of association is inherently linked to and derived 
from freedom of speech.42 In 1958, the Supreme Court reasoned in 
National Association for Advancement of Colored People v. State of 
Alabama that group association inherently enhances advocacy of 
both public and private concerns.43 The Supreme Court in NAACP 
v. Alabama a ed ha    a e a  hether the beliefs sought 
to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, 
religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the 
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest 
c . 44  
The Supreme Court further established in Kusper v. Pontikes 
that the freedom to associate with like-minded people, especially in 
political contexts, is protected by both the First Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that showing a legitimate state interest 
alone is not enough to justify encroaching on it.45 This link between 
the First Amendment and the Fourteenth is based entirely in the 
concept of liberty as put forward by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment 
states:  
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the states wherein they 
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
 
41 Complaint, Dakota Rural Action et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., Case No. 5:19-cv-
5046 (W.D. S.D., Mar. 28, 2019), *7. 
42 See Na  A  f  he Ad a ce e  f C ed Pe e (NAACP) v. State of 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
43 Id. a  460 ( a g ha  [e]ffec e ad cac  f b h b c a d a e  
of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group 
a c a ).   
44 Id. at 460-61. 
45 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) ( a g ha  [ ]he gh   a c a e h he 
ca  a  f e  ch ce  a  eg a  a  f h  ba c c a  
f eed ).  
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.46 
 
The Supreme Court explained in NAACP v. Alabama that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments are inherently linked, because the 
F ee h A e d e  e b ace  f eed  f eech.   Ca e  
involving freedom of association usually examine laws restricting 
political parties: the construction or limitation of political parties, 
how they choose candidates, how its membership is limited, and 
other issues. However, particularly in NAACP v. Alabama, freedom 
of association comes into play with non-profit organizations in 
regards to membership lists in organizations.47 It is within the right 
of a private organization, like the NAACP, to not be required to 
d c e e be h   f he  ga a ; [ ]  f  
a e c  . . .   e a ed  he gh  f [ he NAACP ] 
members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to 
associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the 
ec  f he F ee h A e d e . 48 State and federal 
governments cannot compel non-profit associations, political 
parties, labor unions, or other groups to disclose their associations 
h d d a  e be , a   a  c e a  effec e a 
restraint on freedom of association . . . [t]his Supreme Court has 
recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and 
ac   e  a c a . 49  
NAACP v. Alabama was followed five years later by NAACP 
v. Button, which further analyzed the actions and activities of 
organizations to determine whether they were protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.50 In NAACP v. Button, the state of 
Virginia had drafted and passed a new chapter of the Virginia legal 
c de, Cha e  33, ha  e e ed a  d f e   ca e  
to solicit legal business.51 Th  c ded  he def  f 
e   ca e ,  a  age  f  a  d d a   ga ation 
which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is 
 a a  a d  h ch  ha   ec a  gh   ab . 52 The 
NAACP rightly claimed that the addition of this chapter in Virginia 
 
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).  
47 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 450.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 462.  
50 Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 




a  f ge[d] he gh  f he NAACP a d its members and 
lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek 
legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed 
a d he  gh . 53 The context and wording of Chapter 33 ensured 
that any person who informs another that they have experienced an 
infringement on their legal rights and recommends that they speak 
to an attorney or specific legal group has committed a crime.54 
Chapter 33 was found to be both vague and overbroad due to its lack 
of definition of illegal activity and its prevention of association 
protected by the First Amendment.55 The Supreme Court also found 
Cha e  33 a ed he F ee h A e d e  b  d  
h b g ec ed f eed  f e e  a d a c a . 56 In 
his majority opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that: 
 
[A] State cannot foreclose the exercise of 
constitutional rights by mere labels . . . [A]bstract 
discussion is not the only species of communication 
which the Constitution protects; the First 
Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, 
certainly of lawful ends, against governmental 
intrusion. [Citations omitted.] . . . [L]itigation is not 
a technique of solving private differences; it is a 
means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality 
of treatment by all government, federal, state and 
local . . . [and] is thus a form of political expression.57 
 
Following the determination in NAACP v. Alabama that it is a 
constitutional right for people to associate with each other to 
advance ideas or beliefs, the Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment protects not just individual association or the right of 
people to gather in unions or political parties, but the actions of 
litigation groups in associating with people who need legal 
assistance.58 The First Amendment right to freedom of association, 
then, protects not only the right of individuals to associate in groups 
advocating for political action, but also the right of non-profit and 
 
53 Id. at 428. 
54 Id. at 434.  
55 Id. at 435. 
56 Id. at 437. 




legal aid organizations to provide aid in these contexts.  
 
III. CIVIL RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
Kill he Indian, Sa e he Man : Indigeno s Ci il Righ s Pre-
1924 
 
The relationship between Indigenous peoples and the federal 
government of the United States has been fraught with racism, 
imperialism, abuse, erasure, and genocide.59 There is a plethora of 
documentation regarding the mass murder, rape, assault, trauma, 
and resistance of Indigenous peoples to colonial rule; to recount it 
here would do an injustice to the lives and stories of Indigenous 
peoples, and would take up more space than any one paper could 
possibly contain.60 H e e , he e a e a ha df  f a c a  e a  
in the abusive relationship  between the United States state and 
federal governments and Indigenous peoples which provide context 
to the mantle that these current era critical infrastructure/anti-protest 
laws wear.  
The f  f he e e a   ge e a  e ed he e ca  
era, a name which evokes images of Indigenous peoples being 
removed from their ancestral lands. During this era, many 
Indigenous communities, tribes, and groups were ripped from their 
home territories and moved across the United States in anticipation 
of white immigration into the area. Legally, there were no real 
repercussions. In the words of Dina Gilio-Wh a e , [ ]he  c  
disregard histories of dispossession . . . the action constitutes a form 
of erasure and weakens the legal foundations upon which 
environmental justice might otherwise be constructed. 
 
59 It is difficult to describe the progression, and regression, of Indigenous civil 
rights in the United States without falling into the trap of what has been 
gh f  de c bed a  e  .  I d ge  c e  e a  
simultaneously some of the poorest, yet some of the most vibrant and politically 
active, communities in the United States. However, Indigenous reservations 
remain mostly under the purview of the federal government. Many treatises and 
international laws have been written regarding the potential for tribal self-
determination. The intention of this paper is to analyze current violations of 
Indigenous civil and human rights under the framework in which Indigenous 
peoples currently exist in the United States, and while referencing the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the focus will remain on state 
and federal government violations of Indigenous civil rights.   
60 See generally DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 3.  
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Decontextualization . . . is one way the State system fails Indigenous 
e e  ab   e e e ce e e a  ce. 61  
The most famous events of the relocation era are the forced 
marches such as the Trail of Tears, which forcefully relocated the 
Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, Seminole, and 
Choctaw) from their homelands in the Southeastern United States to 
Oklahoma in 1838-39, and the Long Walk forced on the Navajo 
(Diné) in 1864.62 However, displacement of Indigenous peoples 
from their ancestral homelands h e a d  h ch,  a Na e 
worldview . . . makes  d c  be ee  e e a d a d 63
occurred over more than a century of forced colonization of the 
North American continent.64 Native peoples were pushed out of 
their territories and into distant reservations, which were divorced 
entirely from their histories, customs, and cultures.65 Frequently, 
instead of relocation, Indigenous people were simply killed.  
Relocation continued, in other forms, throughout the years. 
For example, in 1892, a man named Capt. Richard H. Pratt read 
aloud a paper at a convention for like-minded men in the United 
S a e . A g ea  ge e a  ha  a d ha  he  g d I d a   a dead 
e,  he a d, . . . [ ]  a e e, I ag ee . . . b    h : ha  a  
the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian . . . 
a e he a . 66 Pratt is widely credited for founding the first 
federally-funded, off-reservation boarding school for Indigenous 
children.67 These schools were meant to strip Indigenous children of 
he  c a  a d fa a  de e , c e  them to the 
a da d  f h e, E ea , c a  c e , a d h   
whatever remained of Indigenous peoples post-mass colonization.68 
Sch  e P a  e e h gh  e b e a c f he c e  f 
assimilation inherent to the post-Civil War era.69 The Supreme 
 
61 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 57.  
62 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 3, at 112-14, 138-39. 
63 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 36.  
64 Id. at 44-49.  
65 Id. 
66 Richard H. Pratt, Official Report of the Nineteenth Annual Conference of 
Charities and Correction (1892), 46-59, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN 
INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN  1880-1900 260 (Francis 
Paul Prucha ed., 1973).  
67 Id.  
68 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 3, at 211-14. 
69 Id. at 212 (quoting Sun Elk (Taos Pueblo) describing his boarding school 
e e e ce: The  d  ha  I d a  a  e e bad . . . hey kept teaching us 
for seven years. And the books told how bad the Indians had been to the white 
men burning their towns and killing their women and children . . . We all wore 
68 
 
Court adopted a similar viewpoint. In 1886, United States v. 
Kagama cemented Indigenous territories and reservations as 
subordinate to the whims of Congress, declaring that the Major 
Crimes Act of 1885 which provided federal, not tribal, courts 
jurisdiction over certain crimes committed in Indigenous 
communities constitutional.70 Justice Miller, in his opinion, stated 
that:  
 
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They 
are communities dependent on the United States, 
dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for 
their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the 
state, and receive from them no protection . . . From 
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due 
to the course of dealing with them . . . there arises a 
duty of protection, and with it the power . . . The 
power of the government over these remnants of a 
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in 
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as 
to the safety of those among whom they dwell.71  
 
United States rhetoric around Indigenous peoples and their 
communities is and has always been both capitalistic and colonialist. 
Not even the Supreme Court was exempt from this; the language in 
Kagama was that of a colonizer to the conquered. To the Supreme 
Court, Indigenous peoples were wards of the nation, entirely 
dependent on the United States and with no real say either in the 
running of their communities or on the development of the lands 
they now dwelt in. 72 
Kagama was quickly followed by the Dawes Act (P.L. 49-
119) in 1887, dividing reservation territory into individual 
allotments for each Indigenous person; this has become known as 
he a e  e a.73 Initially, these lots could not be sold; however, 
leftover lots that is, lots that were not provided to Indigenous 
 
h e a  c he  a d a e h e a  f d a d e   h e a  ch che  
and e h e a  a . A d , af e  a h e e a  bega   a  ha  
I d a  e e bad ). 
70118 U.S. 375 (1886).  
71 Id. at 383-85. 
72 See id. 
73 The Dawes Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed 2000).  
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people could be sold to outsiders.74 The Dawes Act also provided 
an opportunity for Indigenous people in the United States to obtain 
U.S. c e h , b   f he  ad ed he hab  f c ed 
fe,  beca e Ch a ed, a d e sentially abandoned their cultures 
and heritage.75 Allotment would, especially in large reservations, 
e    a e  f  e e e  b  -Indigenous 
e e , a d,  he d  f Cha e  W , f  ce  h he 
individualistic tone of American society and the assimilationist 
views held by the evangelical Christians then active in Indian 
c . 76 These requirements for obtaining citizenship, even to the 
casual observer, violate the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of Indigenous peoples but at the time, 
Indigenous peoples could not become citizens save through 
ad g c ed fe,  a d h  e e  aff ded he ec  
of the Constitution. In fact, roughly fifty years earlier, Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia (1830), had essentially closed the courts to 
Indigenous peoples, regardless of the veracity or the atrocities put 
forward in their legal claims.77 If  be e ha  he Che ee a  
ha e gh ,  e J ce Ma ha , h    he b a   
which those rights are to be asserted . . . this is not the tribunal which 
ca  ed e  he a   e e  he f e. 78  
 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) firmly cemented the position 
of Indigenous peoples as subject to the whims of Congress, opening 
the doors for Congress to dismantle reservations without even 
consulting with tribes.79 This resulted in the 1906 creation of the 
state of Oklahoma. Following the broad language presented in 
Kagama, the Supreme Court followed up with United States v. 
Sandoval, which he d C g e  c e ed ab   eg a e 
Indigenous peoples in the United States.80 I  h ,  a e  Wa e  
Echo-Ha , e e  e he g e e  ac ed d g he e d 
from 1886 to 1934 . . . it invoked the guardianship principle like an 
aba hed c a  e . 81  
 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS 46 (2005).  
77 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).  
78 Id. at 20. 
79 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).   
80 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
81 WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST 
INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 207 (2010).   
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F a , he S e e C  1884 dec   Elk v. Wilkins 
stated that Indigenous people were not citizens of the United States 
but of their own, individual nations, and thus could not claim 
citizenship regardless of whether they had been born outside of 
Indigenous territory.82 There were no voting rights for Indigenous 
peoples in the United States and, without citizenship, no 
constitutional ones, either.83 This was, however, soon to change.  
 
8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) and the Rise of Red Power 
 
Section 1401(b) of Title 8 of the United States Code states 
ha  The f g shall be nationals and citizens of the United 
States at birth: (b) a person born in the United States to a member of 
a  I d a , E , A e a ,  he  ab g a  be . . . . 84 As 
citizens of the United States, this means that all Indigenous peoples 
born within the borders of the United States hold the same state and 
federal rights as all other citizens including free speech, freedom 
of assembly, and the entitlement of the full protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.85 The Fourteenth Amendment, 
a c a , a e  ha  [a]  e  b   a a ed  he 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they e de. 86 Section 
1401(b) was added to the United States Code in 1924 via the Indian 
Citizenship Act; however, it took until the mid-1970s for the 
establishment of Indigenous peoples as citizens of the United States 
to be fully confirmed.87  
Defendants in Goodluck v. Apache County made the claim 
that following Elk v. Wilkins in 1884, Indigenous peoples were not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and thus not citizens 
entitled to voting rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.88 The lower court in that case held that when any 
party is subject to the plenary power of another, like Indigenous 
reservations are to Congressional authority, that party is subject to 
he c e e a d ed a e  d c  f he a  h e a  
 
82 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).   
83 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1924); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I-XIV. 
84 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1924).  
85 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
86 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
87 Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13, 14 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
88 Id. at 15.  
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power.89 The S e e C  aff ed he d c  c  dec  
in Apache County v. United States the following year.90   
The enshrinement of Indigenous peoples as United States 
citizens via the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act ensured Indigenous 
peoples were now in possession of state and federal constitutional 
rights of free speech and assembly.91 However, civil rights 
protections were grossly underenforced. After the allotment era 
ended, the highly encouraged relocation of Indigenous peoples off 
reservations and into cities allowed for the termination of 
Indigenous reservations. Through this, the assimilation/termination 
era spawned.92 Thirteen separate termination acts were passed 
h gh  he 1950  a d 1960 , e a g e ha  a h d ed 
tribes, including many small, impoverished bands and rancherias in 
California and Oregon . . . [affecting] at least 1.3 million acres and 
11, 000 people . . . cutting off federal services for 3 percent of all 
fede a  ec g ed I d a . 93 
Allotment/termination policies had an impact on 
Indigenous peoples beyond the violation of their rights as citizens of 
the United States. Enduring such brutal attacks on their civil rights 
inspired Indigenous peoples to push back. In 1944, the inaugural 
National Congress of American Indians (he eaf e  NCAI ) e   
Denver, Colorado and demanded tribal sovereignty.94 
Simultaneously, Indigenous activists also pushed for tribal 
sovereignty, as well as combating Indigenous poverty; retaining 
Indigenous territory; and preventing Army Corps projects, 
particularly dams, from damaging lands and rivers that were critical 
to Indigenous communities.95 In 1963, Alcatraz Prison was shut 
down, and after a few false starts, in 1969, a group of Indigenous 
protestors landed on the island and claimed it for Indigenous 
peoples. They called themselves the Indians of All Tribes, and they 
occupied the island for nineteen months.96 A year before, in 1968, a 
group of young Chippewa men, including Dennis Banks and Clyde 
Bellecourt, founded the American Indian Movement (hereafter 
AIM )  a d I d ge  e e  h  had bee  e ca ed, 
 
89 Id. at 16. 
90 429 U.S. 876, 876 (1976).  
91 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
92 WILKINSON, supra note 76, 64-65. 
93 Id. at 81. 
94 Id. at 103. 
95 Id. at 113-28. 
96 Id. at 133-34. 
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forcefully or otherwise, from reservations to the slums of 
Minneapolis.97 AIM quickly developed into a national movement. It 
h ed a c e -ce eb a  a  M  R h e98; led the Trail 
of Broken Treaties to Washington, D.C.; occupied the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs building; protested the infamous Guardians Of the 
Og a a Na  ( GOON ) ad f Og a a S  ba  cha a  
Dick Wilson;99 and, perhaps most famously, occupied Wounded 
Knee for 71 days. By the end of the occupation, two Sioux men had 
been shot to death, there had been more than a dozen firefights 
between occupiers and federal agents, and more than 1,200 people 
had been arrested.100  
Similarly, Indigenous women (who had been excluded from 
AIM d e  e  h  had bec e  acc a ed  d a  
white society . . . [that it] translated into sexist, repressive behavior 
a d  e ) f ded W e  f A  Red Na  (he eaf e  
WARN )  1974.101 Some of those founders, including Phyllis 
Young and Madonna Thunderhawk, were present for the entirety of 
the 2016-2017 protests at Standing Rock.102 Indigenous peoples 
were applying their constitutional right to free speech and 
assembly and the government was taking notice. Hundreds of 
AIM and WARN members were charged with felonies, in an echo 
of what would occur at the #NoDAPL protests more than forty years 
later.103  
At the same time, the Keweenaw Bay Band of Chippewa 
were protesting too, using an elegant combination of illegal fishing 
and filing court cases to enforce treaty rights.104 The Yakama Nation 
in Oregon pushed back against state regulations preventing them, 
and other Indigenous peoples including the Umatilla, Warm 
Springs, and Nez Pearce from fishing in waters protected by 
 
97 Id. at 137. 
98 Id. at 139. 
99 Id. at 144 (de c b g he ad a  a ba  ec  f ce . . .  ee  a  a d 
order. This translated into close and tough surveillance and, apparently, 
beatings f W  ca  e , e ec a  AIM e ). 
100 Alysa Landry, Native History: AIM Occupation of Wounded Knee Begins, 




101 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 116-17. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 148; see also WATER PROTECTOR LEGAL COLLECTIVE, 
waterprotectorlegal.org. 
104 WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 156-57. 
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treaties the state of Oregon had ignored.105 In 1969, they won.106 
From the 1960s onward, Indigenous activists utilized mass 
organization and the First Amendment to push for religious, 
reproductive, social, cultural, and environmental equality, with 
Indigenous activists particularly women [ a g]  
mainstream visibility.107 The use of protest and free speech by 
Indigenous peoples was vastly increasing, and the government
both state and federal was taking notice. 
 
The First Amendment as Applied to the Indigenous Peoples of 
the United States 
 
The majority of precedent regarding the application of the 
First Amendment to Indigenous peoples in the United States relates 
to the Establishment Clause the clause which solemnifies freedom 
of religion in the United States. Notably, in the Encyclopedia of 
American Indian Civil Rights, he g f  F  A e d e  
ed ec   Re g  F eed . 108 Primarily First Amendment 
litigation in Indigenous contexts has been focused on issues such as 
the possession and use of peyote,109 the use of eagle feathers in 
religious ceremonies; and other elements of traditional religious 
practices. The Indian Civil Rights Act, which partly imposes the Bill 
of Rights on Indigenous tribal reservations,110 does not contain an 
Establishment Clause. As explained by Vine Deloria Jr.: 
 
The Free Exercise clause . . . since it does not 
expressly mention Indian tribes, cannot be used as a 
protective constitutional cloak . . . . Congress did 
specifically protect individual religious freedoms in 
 
105 Id. at 165. 
106 Id.  
107 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 118-19.  
108JAMES S. OLSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS 130 
(James S. Olson et al. eds.1997). 
109 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); People v. Woody, 
61 Cal. 2d 716 (1964); see also Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal 
Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). 
110 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303. The Indian Civil Rights Act only applies some civil 
rights to tribal jurisdictions; some, including the Fifteenth Amendment, are 
absent. Similarly, ICRA places Indigenous jurisdictions under the control of 
fede a  c   c  gh  a e , a d e  fede a  dge   e e 
dec  ade b  ba  ff c a   he ad a  f ba  a  he  c  
rights are involved. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND 
TRIBES 241(4th ed. 2012). 
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the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, which prevents 
tribal governments from making or enforcing any 
laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion . . . . The 
1968 act does not, however, contain an 
Establishment Clause, as it is regarded as less 
important for Indians. 111  
 
There is little if any legal or historic precedent regarding the exercise 
of free speech and of free assembly by Indigenous peoples off of 
Indigenous land. The primary cases involving Indigenous rights to 
free speech, Dodge v. Nakai112, Big Eagle v. Andera113, and Janis v. 
Wilson114, among others, mainly explore the conflict between 
Indigenous tribal law and the interpretation of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act by either federal or the Supreme Court. The cases do not, 
and to this point have not, examined the First Amendment rights 
violations in response to Indigenous-led protests.115 As will be 
e ed, h e e , a e eg a e  a ed I d ge  e e  
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of 
association through the construction of critical infrastructure/anti-
protest laws. Though these laws were not written to directly target 
Indigenous peoples, these laws may unconstitutionally target 
Indigenous peoples through their application, preventing them from 
fully enjoying their civil rights under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.116  
    
IV. III. CURRENT TRENDS 
 
Indigenizing Environmental Justice 
 
In January of 2016, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission 
bega  h d g a e e  f hea g   de e e f a  c  gh  
 
111 VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 233 (1983). 
112 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969). 
113 508 F.2d 1293 (D. S.D. 1976).  
114 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D. S.D. 1974).  
115 See E  D ., De  f H a  Re . f O . . S h, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); 
see also L g . N h e  I d a  Ce e e  P ec e A , 485 U.S. 439 
(1988).  
116 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); but see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 
81 (1943).   
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had been abridged by the contamination of the Flint water 
d b  e . 117 These hearings followed in a long line of 
similar studies and analyses based around the concept of 
environmental racism.  
Environmental racism is defined by the Michigan Civil 
R gh  C  a  [ ha ] cc  he  e e f c  
repeatedly suffer disproportionate risks and harms from policies and 
decisions that equally benefit all. This injustice is even greater when 
the benefits of those policies and decisions harm people of color 
h e d a e  be ef g [ h e ]. 118 This definition
based off the definition offered by Professor Robert D. Bullard, who 
ha  bee  de c bed a  he fa he  f e e a  ce 119 is 
incomplete when describing incidents of environmental racism 
against Indigenous peoples. Not only does this definition of 
environmental racism eliminate the incidents of poor white 
communities being affected by pollution, pipeline placements, and 
oil spills120, but the very definitions of environment, justice, and 
ac   he e  e e a  ac  a d e e a  
ce  a f  he  e a ed a a  I d ge  e . 
E ha g he a  ha  a e  d b e  f 
environmental justice fails Indigenous peoples, EJ scholar David 
Schlosberg notes . . . that too often Indigenous conceptions of 
justice and Indigenous ways of understanding land and human 
relations with it a e b c ed   ec g ed a  a . 121 As 
stated by Gilio-Whitaker:  
 
Applying the lens of settler colonialism to the topic 
of environmental justice sheds a different light on the 
processes of history, providing irrefutable linkages 
between all eras and aspects of settler and Indigenous 
contact, environmental injustice, and genocide; they 
are inseparable. As a facet of settler colonialism, 
environmental injustice is linked with a larger 
ongoing process of Indigenous erasure that is built 
 
117 Systemic Racism Through the Lens of Flint, MICH. C.R. COMM N, *iii, 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/VFlintCrisisRep-F-Edited3-13-
17_554317_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GVM-RUCF]. 
118 Id. at 93.  
119 Id. at 93, fn. 240. 
120 See infra Part III.B.3. 
121 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 23.  
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into the structure of the State . . . These actions are 
not new revelations of previously unknown US 
histories; they are familiar genocidal patterns but 
viewed now through a lens focused on environmental 
factors. They are acts of ecological disruption that 
constitute the origin of injustices towards Native 
peoples in what might be called an Indigenous 
e e  e e a  h  f he U ed 
States.122 
 
Under this application, environmental injustice and environmental 
inequity are, in themselves, violations of the civil and human rights 
of Indigenous peoples, under both U.S. law and UNDRIP.123 The 
relocation of Indigenous peoples from their ancestral homelands is 
enough to qualify under this model, even without taking into 
consideration every other atrocity committed against Indigenous 
peoples in the United States. Similarly, acts of environmental racism 
or injustice against Indigenous peoples in the United States are not 
a new violation of their civil and human rights, but an inherited one. 
Under Gilio-Whitake  de , he ge c de f I d ge  e e  
of the Americas the destruction and deprivation of Indigenous 
agricultural resources, deliberate infection of Indigenous 
communities with European diseases, enslavement, forced 
relocation and displacement, and the deliberate erasure of 
Indigenous religions, histories, and cultures is itself 
environmental injustice.124 [I]f e e  c a   e e a  
injustice and settler colonialism is a genocidal structure, then 
environmental justice as an analytical framework must be capable 
of acknowledging the extent to which historical environmental 
disruption structures Native lives today and should factor into the 
f a  f EJ a  a d c e . 125 Indigenous lives, civil rights, 
and human rights under UNDRIP are intimately linked to 
environmental justice, and Indigenous peoples have and will 
continue to exercise their First Amendment right to free speech in 
order to protest the violation of those rights.   
As explored below, the systemic violations of Indigenous 
 
122 Id. at 39. 
123 G.A. 61/295, 2007 Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 2, 
2007), Art. 32 §§ 2-3. 




civil rights via state legislatures across the country follows a similar 
path of environmental and civil injustice through a legal framework.  
 
Mni Wiconi and Oceti Sakowin: The Timeline of #NoDAPL  
 
The impact of the protests at Standing Rock on the First 
Amendment rights of Indigenous peoples and on protest law across 
the United States cannot be overstated. In December 2015, the U.S. 
A  C  f E g ee  (he eaf e  A  C   C ) 
published a draft that outlined its plan to approve the expansion of 
he Da a Acce  P e e (he eaf e  DAPL ) e de ea h 
the Missouri River at the Lake Oahe Reservoir.126 The reservoir, 
which is Corps-controlled, sits several miles upstream of where both 
the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation and Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation get their water.127 Several months previously, the 
Corps, in a previous plan, had projected the construction of the 
pipeline a few miles north of Bismarck, North Dakota; the Corps 
abruptly changed its proposal after an environmental assessment 
indicated that it would be too dangerous for the municipal water 
supply to have a pipeline installed so close to Bismarck.128 This 
sudden change was widely criticized as an act of environmental 
racism, as Bismarck, per the U.S. Census, is approximately 91% 
white.129  
 
126 Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota Access Pipeline Fight, NAT L 





129 Ramon Jacobs-Shaw, What Standing Rock Teaches Us About Environmental 
Racism and Justice, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Apr. 17. 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170417.059659/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/5LWF-ADC2]; see also Systemic Racism Through the Lens of 
Flint, MICH. C.R. COMM N, *93, 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/VFlintCrisisRep-F-Edited3-13-
17_554317_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GVM-RUCF]; see also U.S. Census, 
Bismarck, North Dakota, U.S. CENSUS, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/bismarckcitynorthdakota/RHI1252
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The C  a chae g  de e ed d g he C  
survey of the new proposed installation site at Lake Oahe that there 
e e a  ea  f e ec ded c a  e  h ch gh  be affec ed 
b  he c c  a d a a  f he e e, b  ha   
h c e e   be b ec   effec . 131 Similarly, the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation recommended the Corps 
to cooperate with tribal leaders.132 On July 25, 2016, the Corps 
approved the pipeline route, with a district director claiming that 
he  had e a a ed he a c a ed e e a , ec c, 
cultural, and social effects, and any cumulative effects of [the 
crossing] . . . [it is] not   he b c e e . 133 They had 
not met with tribal leaders. 
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sued the Army Corps, 
claiming that the Corps had not consulted tribe members prior to the 
approval of the pipeline as they were required to, and the Dakota 
Access Pipeline would cause extreme risk to the historic sites within 
the realm of potential impact.134 In April 2016, a few women from 
the Standing Rock Sioux set up camp and named it the Camp of 
 
130 Carl Sack, A #NoDAPL Map, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2016, 11:48AM, 
updated Dec. 2, 2016) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-nodapl-
map_b_581a0623e4b014443087af35 [https://perma.cc/UR2Z-V5WG]. 






Sacred S e  ( Sac ed S e Ca ), the first in what became a 
sprawling, long-term, multi-camp protest.135 Sacred Stone Camp 
was intended to monitor the construction of the pipeline as well as 
indicating tribal dissent to the project.136 As time passed, more and 
more protestors later known as Water Protectors amassed near 
the Lake Oahe crossing. Hundreds of tribes by the end, more than 
three hundred traveled to the Standing Rock camp in North 
Dakota to stand against the construction of the DAPL. Hashtags 
dominated Twitter, including #MniWiconi, #NoDAPL, and 
#StandwithStandingRock as the world began to take notice.137 
Eventually, there were three camps: Sacred Stone Camp, Oceti 
Sa  ( ea g Se e  C c  F e ,  he e  a e f  he 
Sioux people) Camp, and the 1851 Treaty Camp, named for the 
Treaty of Fort Laramie.138 
Pipeline construction, which was scheduled to start on 
August 10, could not begin due to protesters demonstrating at the 
Lake Oahe River crossing.139 Dakota Access LLC, a subsidiary of 
he e e E e g  T a fe  Pa e  (he eaf e  ETP ), 
countersued the Standing Rock Sioux in retaliation.140 ETP also 
hired private security officers, which eventually led to violent 
clashes between the Standing Rock protestors.141 Notably, on 
September 3:  
 
[A]s people attempted to block the digging up of a 
sacred site, ETP brought in a private security firm 
armed with approximately eight attack dogs and 
 
135 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 3. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. 
138 Section 3: The Treaties of Fort Laramie, 1851 & 1868, N.D. STUDIES, 
https://www.ndstudies.gov/gr8/content/unit-iii-waves-development-1861-
1920/lesson-4-alliances-and-conflicts/topic-2-sitting-bulls-people/section-3-
treaties-fort-laramie-1851-1868 [https://perma.cc/5C65-FGDJ] (describing the 
treaties which established the boundaries of Indigenous territory in the Great 
Plains at that time, and which the Standing Rock Sioux had never ceded to the 
United States). 
139 Hersher, supra note 126. 
140 Id. 
141 Eyder Peralta, Dakota Access Pipeline Protests in North Dakota Turn 
Violent, NAT L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 4, 2016, 4:14 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/04/492625850/dakota-access-
pipeline-protests-in-north-dakota-turn-violent [https://perma.cc/UF53-9HKZ] 
( a g ha  [ ] de  f  he ce e h ed ec  ff ce  h ea e g he 
e  h d g ). 
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mace. The security personnel sprayed people directly 
in the face and eyes and pushed the dogs to bite 
people. One dog was unleashed and ran into the 
crowd in attack mode. At least five people and a 
horse were bitten, and around thirty people were 
injured via the chemical spray. Images and video of 
the dog attack went viral on social media, thanks to 
the handful of journalists at the site, particularly Amy 
Goodman of the popular program Democracy Now!, 
for whom an arrest warrant was later issued by the 
M  C  She ff  De a e .142  
 
Though District Judge James Boasberg ordered a temporary 
halt on the pipeline on September 6, 2016, the Governor of North 
Da a de ed he N h Da a Na a  G a d  a  cal law 
e f ce e  ha  had bee  g de a . 143 The 
S a d g R c  S    e  he c c  f he 
pipeline was denied on September 9.144 In response, the Department 
f J ce (he eaf e  DOJ ), he De a e  f he A  (hereafter 
DOA ) a d he De a e  f he I e  (he eaf e  he I e ) 
stated that the construction project should not proceed until the 
Corps had further consulted with the Standing Rock and Cheyenne 
River Sioux tribes.145 ETP ignored this request, and continued 
construction, resulting in twenty-seven Water Protectors were 
arrested by law enforcement for demonstrating at the river 
crossing.146 That same law enforcement a mix of private security 
companies, the North Dakota National Guard, and the Morton 
C  She ff  De a e were filmed using tear gas and water 
cannons against Water Protectors.147 Water Protectors then claimed 
eminent domain on the next segment of land meant for the pipeline, 
citing the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie and stating that the Sioux had 
never ceded the land the pipeline was now meant to be built on.148 
 
142 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 4. 
143 Hersher, supra note 126. 
144 Id. 
145 Id.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  






In retaliation, the military police hired by the ETP conducted a 
raid.149 Weapons used in the raid included Long Range Acoustic 
Devices (LRADs), tasers, concussion grenades, batons, snipers, and 
pepper spray, among other weapons.150 The October 27 assault on 
the camps resulted in the arrest of 141 Water Protectors and many 
injuries.151  
On December 4, the Army Corps announced that it would 
not grant the lake crossing permit, and tha  he be  a   c e e 
[the pipeline] responsibly and expeditiously is to explore alternate 
e  f  he e e c g. 152 However, after the election of 
Donald Trump and his inauguration on January 20, 2017, the 
#NoDAPL protests and the camps were doomed. On January 24, 
2017, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum 
authorizing both the Dakota Access Pipeline and the Keystone XL 
Pipeline.153 On February 23, 2017, the remaining protestors at the 
Oceti Sakowin camp were arrested and removed.154   
While the protest itself was forcibly ended and the camps 
dismantled, the legal battle over the construction and use of the 
DAPL is continuing. Even as the camps were being taken down, the 
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux have been in a 
contentious legal battle with the Army Corps. The most recent filing 
is a supplemental complaint made by the Standing Rock and 
Cheyenne River Sioux tribes.155 The c a  de a d  ha  he 
C  dec   aff   g a  dec  [ f e e 
placement] without a comprehensive environmental review and 
adequate consultation with the Tribe was arbitrary, capricious, and 
in violation of the [Administrative Procedure Act], [the National 
E e a  P c  Ac ], a d he T be  ea  gh . 156  As of 
this time, there has been no response to the complaint from the ETP 
 
149 Hersher, supra note 126. 
150 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 7.  
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 9. 
153 Id. 
154 Julia Carrie Wong, Police remove last Standing Rock protestors in military-
style takeover, THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 23, 2017 4:52 PM) 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/23/dakota-access-pipeline-
camp-cleared-standing-rock [https://perma.cc/6YCM-PL48]. 
155 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribes Litigation on the Dakota Access Pipeline, 
EARTHJUSTICE (updated Nov. 1, 2018), https://earthjustice.org/features/faq-
standing-rock-litigation [https://perma.cc/N3VC-T7LH].  
156 First Supplemental Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe & Cheyenne 
R e  S  T be . U.S. A  C  f E g , Case No. 1:16-cv-1534-JEB 
(D.D.C., Nov. 1, 2018), *2.  
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or the Dakota Access Pipeline.  
Soon after the protests at Standing Rock were shut down, 
bills began to churn out of state legislatures. Oklahoma was most 
likely the first state to sign such a law into effect. As stated above, 
there have been more than 100 laws that have been proposed around 
the United States regarding the restriction or criminalization of 
protests.157 Many of these laws, particularly in the Dakotas, have 
been directly inspired by or constructed from what lawmakers and 
oil companies observed occurring at the #NoDAPL protests. The 
International Human Rights Advocacy Workshop at the University 
of Arizona compiled a report citing the spike in anti-protest law in 
response to the Standing Rock protests.158 The report claims that 
[ ]he e a  g e  a d  c a g d e  a d c d g 
the use of excessive force towards human rights defenders including 
I d ge  e e . 159 As many bills and laws continue to be 
proposed, discussed, and passed across the United States many 
more than can be handled in a single paper only a handful of them 
will be examined here.  
It must be noted that after the writing, passing, and 
implementation of a critical infrastructure law in Oklahoma, the 
A e ca  Leg a e E cha ge C c  (he eaf e  ALEC ) 
drafted a sample bill based upon the Oklahoma law, and released it 
on their website. ALEC is an organization of state legislators and 
representatives from the private sector including oil companies
which frequently collaborate on the construction of model bills for 
state governments.160 A ab e e a e f ALEC  a e b   
the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 
 
157 US P e  La  T ac e , I  C . f  N -For-Profit Law, Enacted Bills, 
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/?location=&status=enacted&issue=&da
te=&type=legislative [https://perma.cc/YN7Q-ZLE5]. 
158 Indigenous Resistance to the Dakota Access Pipeline: Criminalization of 
Dissent and Suppression of Protest, Rep. to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-C , I  H . R . Ad cac  






160 American Legislative Exchange Council, Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Act, ALEC, https://www.alec.org/model-policy/critical-infrastructure-
protection-act/ [https://perma.cc/2J36-P7UN] (states that the sample bill 
[d a ] a  f   a  e ac ed  2017 b  he S a e f O ah a ).  
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popularly known in Arizona as SB 1070.161 A number of states have 
used the sample critical infrastructure bill drafted by ALEC to draft 
their own critical infrastructure laws; much of the same language is 
to be found in the federal Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines 
and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019 (hereafte  he P e e  Ac ), 






The impact of the #NoDAPL protests have been felt across 
the country. Not only were the camps at Standing Rock 
unprecedented at their height they housed thousands of people163, 
with a population representing more than 300 Indigenous tribes and 
communities in the United States but legislators around the U.S. 
watched and listened. Before the camps were even dismantled, in 
January 2017, lawmakers in Oklahoma introduced House Bill 1123 
(he eaf e  HB 1123 ), c d f g a e  b ec , Sec  1792 f 
Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which stated:  
 
A. Any person who shall willingly trespass or enter 
property containing a critical infrastructure facility 
without permission by the owner . . . or lawful 
occupant . . . shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or by 
imprisonment in the county jail for a term of six (6) 
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. If it 
 
161 Talk of the Nation, How Corporate Interests Got SB 1070 Passed, NAT L 
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 9, 2010, 1:00 PM) 
https://www.npr.org/2010/11/09/131191523/how-corporate-interests-got-sb-
1070-passed [https://perma.cc/UGP7-AMGM]. 
162 Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019: 
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS 




163 Alleen Brown, Trump Administration Asks Congress to Make Disrupting 
Pipeline Construction a Crime Punishable by 20 Years in Prison, THE 





is determined the intent of the trespasser is to 
willfully damage, destroy . . . or impede or inhibit 
operations of the facility . . . [they shall be fined] not 
less than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) or by 
an imprisonment in the custody of the Department of 
Corrections for a term of one (1) year, or by both . . .  
D. A  ed  h  ec , c ca  f a c e 
facility means:  
1. One of the following . . .  
p. a crude oil or refined products storage and 
distribution facility including, but not limited to . . . 
pipeline interconnections . . . [or] below or 
aboveground pipeline . . .164   
 
HB 1123 also fines any organization it deems or have been found to 
be c a  e  e  he amount of said fine authorized by the 
a a e  f h  ec that is, anywhere up to a 
million dollars.165  
The sponsor of the bill, Rep. Scott Biggs of the Oklahoma 
State House, stated that he developed the bill as a response to 
watching the #NoDAPL protests unfold in North Dakota.166 On the 
H e f , he a ed, [a]c  he c , e ha e ee  e a d 
time again these protests have turned violent, these protests have 
disrupted the infrastructure in other states . . . . This is a preventative 
ea e . . .  a e e ha  d e  ha e  he e. 167  
HB 1123  e f a  b  c a g  ec  c ca  
f a c e.  A  ed ab e, he a g age ed  HB 1123 ha  






164 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
165 Id.  
166 Staff, In wake of environmental protests, legislation aims to protect critical 




167 Id.  
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2. North and South Dakota168 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that North Dakota, the epicenter of 
the Standing Rock protests, has had not one, but five separate laws 
criminalizing protest within its borders the most of any state in the 
nation.169 One of them, House Bill 1203 (Eliminating driver liability 
for hitting protestors) was defeated in the House, but the other four 
have been enacted into law.170 Two bills stand out: Senate Bill 2044 
(Heightened penalties for protests near critical infrastructures) 
(he eaf e  SB 2044 ), h ch a  g ed  a  b  G e  
Doug Burgum on April 10, 2019) and House Bill 1293 (Expanded 
scope of criminal trespass) (he eaf e  HB 1293 ). HB 1293 a  
signed into law on February 23, 2017 the same day that the camps 
at Lake Oahe Reservoir were violently dismantled by the Morris 
C  She ff  De a e .171 Analysis of North Dakota statutes 
will be restricted to SB 2044, as it is a critical infrastructure law, but 
  a   e ha  HB 1293 a  ff ce   e a 
citation with a $250 fine for trespassing, as opposed to filing 
c a  cha ge . 172 Further analysis of the implications of HB 
1293 must be conducted elsewhere.  
SB 2044 (codified at 12.1-21-06 in the North Dakota 
Century Code) amends the code to make it a Class C felony173
punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000, an imprisonment of up 
to five years, or both174 if any person intentionally causes:  
 
1. [A] substantial interruption or impairment of a 
critical infrastructure facility or a public service by:  
 
168 North and South Dakota have multiple Indigenous communities which, 
similar to the Navajo Nation in the Four Corners, are not contained by state 
borders. The Standing Rock Sioux Reservation crosses the border between 
North and South Dakota. It is for this reason they have been grouped together in 
this segment of the paper.  
169 U.S. Protest Law Tracker, Enacted Laws,  
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/?location=&status=enacted&issue=&da
te=&type=legislative [https://perma.cc/VCD6-59LU]. 
170 H.B. 1203, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess.  (N.D. 2017).  
171 S.B. 2044, 66th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019); H.B. 1293, 2019 
Leg., 66th Sess. (N.D. 2019).  
172 Office of the Governor, Burgum signs bills into law to protect landowner 
rights, deter criminal activity, N.D. S a e G  (Feb. 23, 2017, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.governor.nd.gov/news/burgum-signs-bills-law-protect-landowner-
rights-deter-criminal-activity [https://perma.cc/B8HR-KHCW].  
173 H.B. 1293, 2019 Leg., 66th Sess. (N.D. 2019).  
174 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (2019). 
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a. Tampering with or damaging the tangible property 
of another; . . . 
c. Damaging, destroying, vandalizing, defacing, or 
tampering with equipment in a critical infrastructure 
facility; 
d. Damaging, destroying, vandalizing, defacing, 
impeding, inhibiting, or tampering with the 
operations of a critical structure facility; or  
e. Interfering, inhibiting, impeding, or preventing the 
construction or repair of a critical infrastructure 
facility.175  
 
On its face, SB 2044 is a direct reaction to the Standing Rock 
protests, where Indigenous protestors would chain themselves to 
heavy equipment, stand in the way of machinery, or raise flags on 
unceded territory.176 However, SB 2044 contains another subsection 
h ch e  c a e  ga a  h ch [ha e] ed g  
or been convicted of a violation under section 12.1-06-04 for 
conspiring with an individual who has pled guilty or been convicted 
under subsection 1 must be assessed a fine equivalent to the penalty 
. . .   e ceed e h d ed h a d d a . 177 The concepts of 
interfering with, inhibiting, and impeding the construction or repair 
of a critical infrastructure facility the definition of which includes 
everything from a railway switchyard to below- or above-ground 
pipelines are not defined in-statute.178 
South Dakota has drafted and passed similar laws. Most 
notably, the South Dakota State Senate drafted Senate Bill 189 
(he eaf e  SB 189 ), h ch a  g ed b  he G e  f S h 
Dakota, Kristi Noem, on March 27, 2019. SB 189, described as a 
e e a e aga   b g.  Wh e SB 189   a c cal 
infrastructure law, it shares multiple qualities with the critical 
infrastructure laws investigated in this paper, and was derived from 
similar motives, as will be explored later. SB 189 declares liability 
to the state if:  
 
[J]ointly and severally with any other person . . . the 
 
175 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(1) (2019). 
176 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, 3-10.  
177 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(4) (2019).  
178 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(1)(e) (2019). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 




1) Participates in any riot and directs, advises, 
encourages, or solicits any other person participating 
in the riot to acts of force or violence; 
2) Does not personally participate in any riot but 
directs, advises, encourages, or solicits other 
persons participating in the riot to acts of force or 
violence, or; 
3) Upon the direction, advice, encouragement, or 
solicitation of any other person, uses force or 
violence, or makes any threat to use force or 
violence, if accompanied by immediate power of 
execution, by three or more persons, acting together 
and without authority of law. . . .179  
 
A e   a  d d a ,  e e, a c a , 
partnership, cooperative, limited liability company, corporation, 
[non- f ], he  e ,  a  g  ac g a  a . 180 A riot, 
acc d g  S h Da a a ,  a fe  h ch e  [a]  
use of force or violence or any threat to use force or violence, if 
accompanied by immediate power of execution, by three or more 
e , ac g ge he  a d h  a h  f a  . . . . 181 SB 
189 also subjects any person to the jurisdiction of South Dakota 
c  f   b g ha  e   a riot in this state, regardless 
of whether the person engages in riot boosting personally, or 
h gh a  e ee, age ,  b d a . 182 This means, 
essentially, that any person including non-profits who 
e c age  e e f d  ha e bee  g  de  h  statute, 
whether in person, over the phone, over a text message, via a retweet 
 T e ,  a  he  f  f e c age e   c a ,  
may be found liable in a South Dakota court. This is regardless of 
whether that person or organization was present in South Dakota at 





179 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 2(1)-(3) (S.D. 2018) (emphasis 
added). 
180 Id. at § 1.  
181 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10-1 (2019).  
182 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019 at § 3. 
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3. Louisiana  
 
The Bayou Bridge Pipeline actually connects with the 
Dakota Access Pipeline in a somewhat roundabout way, linking 
thousands of miles across the nation at the southern border of 
Colorado.183 The pipeline  is, according to the American Civil 
L be e  U  (he eaf e  ACLU ), 162.5 e  g, f  La e 
Charles to St. James, through 700 bodies of water, including the 
Atchafalaya Basin and Bayou LaFourche, the source of drinking 
water for the United Houma Nation and other surrounding 
c e . 184  
 
 
Map of Bayou Bridge Pipeline, Dan Swenson, The Advocate185 
 
Approximately three months after the end of the Standing 
Rock protests, the Louisiana state legislature passed House Bill 727 
(he eaf e  HB 727 ). HB 727 a e ded L a a a  R.S. 14:61, 
and enacted R.S. 14:61(B)(3) as well as 14:61.1. HB 727 was 
drafted by the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association 
(he eaf e  LMOGA ). The e  e  f he a , h ch e   
effect on August 1, 2018, states the following:  
 
 
183 Connor Gibson, State Bills to Criminalize Peaceful Protest of Oil & Gas 
Cri ical Infras r c re, POLLUTERWATCH (Feb. 18, 2019) 
https://polluterwatch.org/State-Bills-Criminalize-Peaceful-Protest-Oil-Gas-
Critical-Infrastructure-pipelines [https://perma.cc/Z2LT-9ESX] (citing map). 
184 Complaint, White Hat et al. v. Landry et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-00322, *4 
(M.D. La., May 22, 2019).  
185 David J. Mitchell, Bayou Bridge Pipeline ready for service April 1, 





61. Unauthorized entry of a critical infrastructure.  
B. For the purposes of this Section, the following 
words shall have the following meanings:  
(1) C ca  f a c e  ea  a  a d a  
structures, equipment, or other immovable or 
movable property located upon . . . pipelines . . . or 
any site where the construction or improvement of 
any facility or structure referenced in this Section is 
occurring . . . . 
(3) Pipeline means flow, transmission, distribution, 
or gathering lines, regardless of size or length, which 
transmit and transport oil, gas, petrochemicals, 
minerals or water in a solid, liquid, or gaseous state. 
. . .  
D. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to apply 
to or prevent the following: 
(1) Lawful assembly and peaceful and orderly 
petition, picketing, or demonstration for the redress 
of grievances or to express ideas or views regarding 
legitimate matters of public interest, including but 
not limited to any labor dispute . . . .  
(2) La f l commercial or recrea ional ac i i ies 186 
 
The phrasing of the 14:61 and 14:61.1 amendments and additions 
drafted in HB 727 do not demarcate between visible, above-ground 




S a   b  ed ab e, H e B  3557 (he eaf e  HB 
3557 ) de  a e d e   S b e B, T e 4 f he Te a  
Government Code to provide a new chapter.  
 
424.001. Def . I  h  cha e , c ca  
f a c e fac  ha  he ea g assigned by 
Section 423.0045(a)(1-a) and also includes:  
(1) any pipeline transporting oil or gas or the 
products or constituents of oil or gas; and 
 
186 LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:61(B)-(D) (2018) (emphasis added on new text of law).  
187 Id. at § (B)(1). 
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(2) a facility or pipeline described by this section that 
is under construction and all equipment and 
appurtenances used during that construction . . .  
424.052. Offense: Impairing or Interrupting 
Operation of Critical Infrastructure Facility.  
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the 
effective consent of the owner, the person enters or 
remains on or in a critical infrastructure facility and 
intentionally or knowingly impairs or interrupts the 
operation of the facility. 
(b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony 
 
424.054. Offense: Intent to Impair or Interrupt 
Operation of a Critical Infrastructure Facility.   
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the 
effective consent of the owner, the person enters or 
remains on or in a critical infrastructure facility with 
the intent to impair or interrupt the operation of the 
fac  
 
424.055. Punishment for Corporations and 
Associations. Notwithstanding Section 12.51, Penal 
Code, a court shall sentence a corporation or 
association adjudged guilty of an offense under this 
subchapter to pay a fine not to exceed $500,000.188  
 
Sections 424.052 and 424.054 are both categorized as state jail 
fe e , h ch  Te a  a  a e hab e b  c f e e   a 
state jail for any term of not more than two years or less than 180 
da . 189 Add a , h e c c ed f a e a  fe e  [ ]  
addition to confinement . . . may be punished by a fine not to exceed 
$10,000. 190 Similar to HB 727 in Louisiana, HB 3557 does not 
differentiate between above- or below-ground pipelines. It does not 
d ffe e a e be ee  he a ce f e e   
app e a ce  he  he  a e - or off-grounds of a pipeline 
facility. This bill was signed into law on June 14, 2019 and will go 
into effect on September 1, 2019.191  
 
188 H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019). 
189 TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.35(a) (2019). 
190 Id. at (b). 




5. Federal  
 
The development of the state anti-protest laws detailed 
above appears to only be the opening act. As of June 3, 2019, the 
Trump administration has proposed a new act, the Protecting Our 
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019. This 
act correlates almost exactly to similar laws first proposed in 
Oklahoma and then ad ed b  a e  a d he a  a ALEC  
sample critical infrastructure bill.192 Under the Pipelines Act, 
Section 60123(b) of Title 49 of the U.S. Code already a stalwart 
defense against any attack on pipelines in the U.S., with a twenty 
year prison sentence for anyone found to be damaging or destroying 
those pipes is amended to: 
 
(1) [ e] da ag g  de g  a d [ e ] 
da ag g, de g, a da g, a e g h, 
impeding the operation of, disrupting the operation 
of, or inhibiting the operation of  
(2) [ e ] c d g a fac  a ead   e a  
and a facility under construction and intended to be 
operated as such a facility on completion of the 
c c ,  bef e  a e g .193  
 
This would transform Section 60123(b) to read:  
 
A person knowingly and willfully damaging, 
destroying, vandalizing, tampering with, impeding 
the operation of, disrupting the operation of, or 
inhibiting the operation of an interstate gas pipeline 
facility . . . including a facility already in operation 
and a facility under construction and intended to be 
operated as such a facility on completion of the 
construction, or attempting or conspiring to do such 
 
192 Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019: 
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS 




193 Id. (emphasis added). 
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an act, shall be fined . . . imprisoned for not more 
than 20 years, or both . . . .194 
 
Federal charges would apply to anyone who attempts to damage, 
destroy, tamper with, impede, inhibit, or disrupt the operation of, or 
even vandalize an interstate pipeline. These charges carry a sentence 
of up to twenty years. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, under the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
c a  ha  he a   e ded  e e  a f  e  
from exercising their [F]irst [A] e d e  gh . 195  Unlike SB 
189 and HB 1123, the Pipelines Act does not currently include 
provisions that could criminalize agencies or non-profits supporting 
protestors and facilitating free speech. However, should the 
Pipelines Act be passed, it will provide ammunition to prosecutors 
to charge organizations with state and federal crimes in both South 
Dakota and Texas.  
 
V. IV. THE CHILLING OF INDIGENOUS FREE SPEECH BY 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE LAWS 
 
These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws Are 
Unconstitutional on Their Face and In Their Application  
 
Establishing whether a law violates the First Amendment 
requires examining the law to determine whether it is vague, 
overbroad, or both. As per the precedent set post-Dennis, if a law is 
so vaguely defined that free speech cannot be exercised without 
potential criminalization, then it is unconstitutional. Similarly, if a 
law is so broadly defined that protected speech is criminalized 
alongside unprotected speech, it violates the First Amendment. Each 
of the six laws detailed above are vague, overbroad, or both. They 
are unconstitutional both on their face and in their application and 
must be severed or entirely repealed to fully protect Indigenous 
e e  gh   f ee eech a d a e b .  
 
 
194 Id. (emphasis added). See also 49 U.S.C. § 60123(b).  
195 Stephen Cunningham & Catherine Traywick, Pipe Protesters Could Face 20-






1. These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws are 
Unconstitutionally Vague and Misleading to the Public 
 
Each of the laws provided above have vague or overbroad 
clauses which result in the chilling of free speech. These clauses can 
be divided into three distinct forms: the impeding or impairing 
clause, the advising and encouraging clause, and the above- and 
below-ground clause, which is discussed further in Part 2 of this 
section. The first of these clauses, the impeding or impairing clause, 
presents in various forms in four of the six laws listed above, 
including the federal Pipelines Act. The impeding or impairing 
clause is unconstitutionally vague, serving only to confuse and 
mislead the public, and result in each of the four laws it appears in 
being unconstitutional. 
As per the Rules of Construction followed by the Rehnquist 
Supreme Court, dictionary definitions of terms can be used unless 
Congress (state or federal) have provided a specific definition.196 As 
unless otherwise stated none of the laws we are examining here have 
provided definitions for the terms they are using, turning to the 
dictionary provides some sort of guidance as to what kinds of 
behavior these clauses may be describing. The Merriam-Webster 
D c a  def e  he e b ede  a   e fe e h or slow 
he g e  f  e h g.197 S a ,  def e  h b  a   
h b  f  d g e h g    h d  chec ; e a  a d 
 a  a   d h  f c , ab ,  a ;  ea e  
 a e e. 198 F a , e   def ed a     
h de  b  b ea g ,   b ea  he f   c  f,  
  b ea    a  ac . 199 These terms, in one form or 
another, are present in four of the six laws that have been described 
above: HB 1123 in Oklahoma; SB 2044 in North Dakota; HB 3557 
in Texas; and the Pipelines Act as proposed by the Trump 
 
196 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Rehnq is  Co r s 
Canons of Statutory Construction, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (derived from 
a e d   F a d: La  a  E b ). 
197 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Impede, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/impede [https://perma.cc/547J-P7Y8]. 
198 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Impair, merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/inhibit; https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/impair [https://perma.cc/HWY4-TGFP]. 





In its first appearance in HB 1123 (presumably the first of 
any of the critical infrastructure laws), the impeding or impairing 
clause is added to the establishment of intent of anyone convicted 
under the statute. Under HB 1123, codified into law at Title 21, 
Sec  1792 f he O ah a S a e C de, [ ]f   de e ed he 
intent of the trespasser [on a critical infrastructure property] is to 
willfully damage, destroy . . . or impede or inhibit operations of the 
fac  . . .  (e ha  added) he  ha  e a e   be f ed  
less than $10,000 or given a prison sentence of up to a year.201 This 
marks an increase of the fine by ten times its original amount as the 
original trespass fine, and doubling the potential prison time.202  
This language is mirrored almost perfectly by the draft bill 
proposed by ALEC, which has been used by multiple states as a 
basis for their own laws.203 This is not surprising, as HB 1123 in 
O ah a a  he ad ed a  f  ALEC  d af  c ca  
f a c e b . ALEC  b , h ch a  a e  e f he 
impeding and impairing clause, repeats the language of HB 1123 
almost exactly, stating:  
 
Section 2. {Criminal Penalties.}. 
A. Any person who shall willfully or knowingly 
trespass or enter property containing a critical 
infrastructure facility . . . shall, upon conviction, be 
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not 
less than {dollar figure}, or by imprisonment . . . or 
by both such fine and imprisonment. If it is 
 
200 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017); S.B. 2044 66th Leg. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019); H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 
2019); Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 
2019: Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND 




201 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
202 Id. 
203 Connor Gibson, State Bills to Criminalize Peaceful Protest of Oil & Gas 
Cri ical Infras r c re, POLLUTERWATCH (Feb. 18, 2019) 
https://polluterwatch.org/State-Bills-Criminalize-Peaceful-Protest-Oil-Gas-
Critical-Infrastructure-pipelines; see also American Legislative Exchange 





determined the intent of the trespasser is to 
f  impede or inhibit operations of the 
facility, the person shall, upon conviction, be guilty 
f a fe 204 
 
ALEC  b l has been modified and introduced in more than twenty 
states since it was introduced by the organization.205   
L e O ah a  HB 1123, SB 2044  N h Da a 
amended North Dakota Code. The new subsection of 12.1-21-06(1) 
now includes subsections (d) and (e), h ch a e ha  d. . . . 
impeding, inhibiting, or tampering with the operations of a critical 
structure facility; or e. Interfering, inhibiting, impeding, or 
preventing the construction or repair of a critical infrastructure 
fac  a e  a C a s C felony, which carries a $10,000 fine, a 
prison sentence of up to five years, or both.206 Similarly, HB 3557 
in Texas introduces a whole set of subsections, each including the 
impeding or impairing clause. The language is not matched 
exactly the law prohibits impairing or interruption of a critical 
infrastructure facility but similar enough that it has clearly been 
drawn from similar intent. Notably:  
 
424.052. Offense: Impairing or Interrupting 
Operation of Critical Infrastructure Facility.  
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the 
effective consent of the owner, the person enters or 
remains on or in a critical infrastructure facility and 
intentionally or knowingly impairs or interrupts the 
operation of the facility. 
(b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony  
 
424.054. Offense: Intent to Impair or Interrupt 
Operation of a Critical Infrastructure Facility.   
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the 
effective consent of the owner, the person enters or 
remains on or in a critical infrastructure facility with 
 
204 American Legislative Exchange Council, Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Act, ALEC, https://www.alec.org/model-policy/critical-infrastructure-
protection-act/ [https://perma.cc/F84Y-BLVF]. 
205 Complaint, White Hat et al. v. Landry et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-00322, *16 
(M.D. La., May 22, 2019). 
206 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(1) (2019). 
96 
 
the intent to impair or interrupt the operation of the 
fac  
 
424.055. Punishment for Corporations and 
Associations. Notwithstanding Section 12.51, Penal 
Code, a court shall sentence a corporation or 
association adjudged guilty of an offense under this 
subchapter to pay a fine not to exceed $500,000.207  
 
Beyond the issues with vagueness in how HB 3557 has been 
constructed, HB 3557 adds additional consequences for any kind of 
organization found guilty of impairing or interrupting the operation 
of a critical infrastructure facility, slapping them with a fine of up to 
five hundred thousand dollars. Critically, this subsection could 
extend to non-profit and legal groups which advocate and organize 
any kind of protest or demonstration against the building or 
existence of a pipeline in the state of Texas, if they fall into the 
definition of a corporation or association. Organizations such as 
EarthJustice and the ACLU will be obvious potential victims of this 
subsection, but some of the loudest voices against the installation 
and funding of pipelines in Texas have been Indigenous 
organizations. HB 3557, which transforms interference with critical 
infrastructure from a misdemeanor to a felony, would have 
immediate consequences for the Indigenous peoples of southern 
Texas, particularly the Carrizo Camecrudo of South Texas. The 
Carrizo Camecrudo have been in long-term opposition to not only 
the Rio Grande LNG plant but also the possibility of two Kinder 
Morgan pipelines from the Permian Basin to Brownsville.208 The 
construction of these entities would effectively cram the Carrizo 
Camecrudo between two natural gas pipelines and the proposed 
southern border wall.209 The companies do not have any legal 
obligation to consult with tribal leadership prior to installation, as 
 
207 H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019). 
208 Frank Hopper, Kill he bill! Sa e he land!  Na i e pro ec ors disr p  Te as 







the Carrizo Camecrudo are not federally recognized as a tribe.210 A 
demonstration against the bill in the Texas State House of 
Representatives by the Carrizo Camecrudo and the Society of 
Native Nations led to a number of people receiving criminal trespass 
warnings.211 Should the Carrizo Camecrudo and Society of Native 
Nations continue to protest the installation and development of 
pipelines in the state of Texas, they could be found as having 
impaired or interrupted the function of a critical infrastructure, and 
fined up to half a million dollars.  
Perhaps most critically, this impeding and impairing 
language is present in the proposed Pipelines Act, which would 
result in the amendment of Title 49, Section 60123(b) to include the 
h a e a e g h, impeding the operation of, disrupting the 
operation of, or inhibiting the operation of an interstate gas pipeline 
fac  (e ha  added).212 Impeding and inhibiting the operation 
of a gas pipeline have critically not been defined in the proposed 
amendments, despite there being two separate subsections in the act 
for definitions relating to pipelines and property damage thresholds, 
respectively.213 The construction of this clause in the Pipelines Act 
is critical, as it has perhaps the most extreme punishment of any of 
the statutes examined in this context. Should an individual be found 
to be impeding or inhibiting the operation of an interstate gas 
pipeline under the Pipelines Act, then they could be punished with 
up to twenty years in prison.214 Despite these hefty consequences, 
there are no definitions offered for impeding, disrupting, or 
inhibiting in the context of the Pipelines Act.215 
 
210 Id. See also Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services 
from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1200 (Feb. 1, 
2019).  
211 Hopper, supra note 208.  
212 Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019: 
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., (Mar. 5, 2019) 
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/protecting-our-infrastructure-pipelines-and-
enhancing-safety-act-2019-section-section-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/VZ8M-
DZHW] (emphasis added). 
213 Id.  
214 Id. See also 49 U.S.C. § 60123(b).  
215 Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019: 
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS 






In fact, none of the above laws, proposed or enacted, have 
offered any kind of definition for their impeding and impairing 
clauses. Without proper definition of these terms, there is no way to 
reasonably determine whether an individual is impeding or 
impairing the function or installation of pipelines. Not only do these 
laws lack the requisite notice towards the public regarding 
criminalized conduct automatically rendering it 
unconstitutional it lacks the narrow scope required by 
constitutional First Amendment regulation; the clause automatically 
renders these laws and bills overly vague.216 In these contexts, 
impede has not been federally defined, and there are no definitions 
offered in-statute for any of the state or federal proposals. Would it, 
under HB 3557, be illegal to protest the arrival of a backhoe, two 
miles away from any pipeline or any pipeline-housing facility? 
Would standing in the middle of a road qualify as impairing or 
interrupting the operation of a critical infrastructure facility, or 
impairing the operation of an interstate pipeline under the Pipelines 
Act? What about preventing cars from entering the property of the 
facility? Is that disrupting the operation of a pipeline under the 
Pipelines Act? If they are on or off the property line, does it matter? 
The egregious lack of specificity and extraordinary level of 
vagueness in these statutes makes it impossible for any arbiter of 
justice to effectively and constitutionally apply them, no matter the 
case. When applying the requisite notice requirement, the impeding 
and impairing clause alone renders more than half the statutes 
examined in this paper unconstitutional.  
While SB 189 in South Dakota lacks the impeding and 
impairing clause, as it is more explicitly an anti-protest law rather 
than a critical infrastructure law, it presents its own unique clause 
which ensures it is unconstitutionally vague. SB 189 which was 
constructed in direct and deliberate response to the #NoDAPL 
protests ensures that a person (defined to include individuals, non-
profits, corporations, and other organizations) is criminalized if:  
 
[J]ointly and severally with any other person . . . the 
person:  
 
216 Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33 ( a g [ ]he b ec ab e a  f ag e e  
and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally 
accused . . . but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment 
freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper 
a ca ).  
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1) Participates in any riot and directs, advises, 
encourages, or solicits any other person participating 
in the riot to acts of force or violence; 
2) Does not personally participate in any riot but 
directs, advises, encourages, or solicits other persons 
participating in the riot to acts of force or violence, 
or; 
3) Upon the direction, advice, encouragement, or 
solicitation of any other person, uses force or 
violence, or makes any threat to use force or 
violence, if accompanied by immediate power of 
execution, by three or more persons, acting together 
and without authority of law . . . .217  
 
Wh e d ec  a d c  ha e he   e -of-art 
def , he e f he d  ad e  a d e c age  
presents its own issues of overbroad language. Again, when no 
definition is offered in statute, the canons of construction tell us to 
turn to dictionaries.218 Merriam-Web e  def e   ad e  a   
give someone a recommendation about what should be done; to give 
ad ce 219 a d  e c age  a , a g he  def ,  
e h c age, ,  h e. 220  In the rapidly transforming 
era of social media and Internet communities, where Twitter, 
Snapchat, and Instagram are as much a political platform as The Hill 
or The New York Times, advising a riot could mean practically 
anything. Practical examples range from retweeting a livestream of 
a protest on Twitter, to sharing a Facebook post, to answering a 
e  e   a e age b a d,  a -profit director 
sending an email suggesting that an employee remain one more day 
at a protest action.221 Without a properly enumerated, specific 
 
217 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 2(1)-(3) (S.D. 2018) (emphasis 
added). 
218 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phlip P. Frickey, The Rehnquist Co r s 
Canons of Statutory Construction, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (derived from 
a e d   F a d: La  A  E b ). 
219 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Advise, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/advise [https://perma.cc/CT6F-FWF6]. 
220 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Encourage, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/encourage [https://perma.cc/JEV2-J8F4]. 
221 A  a ed b  he ACLU, [a]  e  ca  e   a without any 
e  b  b  P a ff .  C a , Dakota Rural Action et al. v. Noem et al., at 
16, (W.D. S.D., Mar. 28, 2019). A  a ed b  he ACLU, [a]  e  ca  e  
into a riot h  a  e  b  b  P a ff .  C a , Dakota Rural 
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definition, , the imagination runs wild, and the consequences equally 
so. 
South Dakota courts can find someone guilty of advising or 
encouraging a riot in South Dakota without that person even being 
present in-state. Thanks to the phrasing of the bill, both individuals 
and groups could be found liable for encouraging protestors in any 
way, regardless of whether or not the encouraging individual 
ac a  e gage    b g  he e e .222 This could result 
in thousands of people if not hundreds of thousands being subjected 
 S h Da a  d c , ega d e  f he   e a  
culpability.  
Due to their lack of clear definition, these phrases in both 
state and federal law, enacted and proposed ensure that these laws 
violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Their 
vagueness emulates exactly the type of language described by the 
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button. Button sh ed ha  a da d  
of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free 
e e  . . . F ,  a a g a a e  h b  effec   
such rights, this [Supreme] Court has not hesitated to take into 
account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts 
be de  ha  a  ba . 223 If a law is so vague as to be used to penalize 
those who are exercising their constitutional rights to free speech, 
free association, and protest, then that law is unconstitutional. While 
it is understandable, as the South Dakota legislature points out, to 
restrict and criminalize deliberately starting or encouraging a riot, 
the terms described in this statute are too vague and confusing for a 
judge to adequately litigate the matter.224 The solution, as put 
forward in Hicks and Reno, is to end enforcement of the entire law 
so long as one aspect of it remains unconstitutional, and to limit or 
partially invalidate the construction of each law as to not allow state 
or federal legislatures to violate the First Amendment rights of 
advocates.225 The da ge  de c bed b  J ce B e a  f he 
existence of a penal statute susceptible to sweeping and improper 
 
Action et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., Case 5:19-cv-05026-LLP, at *16. (W.D. S.D., 
Mar. 28, 2019). 
222 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb., § 2-3 (S.D. 2019, § 23); S.B. 189, 94th 
Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 2-3 (S.D. 2018). 
223 Button, 371 U.S. at 432. 
224 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb.., § 2-3 (S.D. 2019).S.B. 189, 94th Sess., 
Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 23 (S.D. 2018). 
225 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003).  
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a ca   c ea  a cab e he e.226 To fulfill the requirements 
of Supreme Court precedent, this would, by necessity, mean an 
immediate severing of each of the impeding and impairing clauses 
of each of these laws, and the advising and encouraging clause in 
SB 189.  
HB 1123, SB 2044, HB 3557, and the Pipelines Act are all 
unconstitutionally vague. Whether they include the overly vague 
impeding or impairing clause, or the equally vague advising and 
encouraging clause, all four of them have been found to be so 
imprecise as to intrude on the right to free speech of both individuals 
and organizations. Without the immediate severing and cleansing of 
these unconstitutional clauses from the texts of these statutes, these 
four laws will continue to unconstitutionally cut broad swaths out of 
the First Amendment rights of protestors in the relevant states and 
violate Indigenous civil rights.  
 
2. These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws are 
Unconstitutionally Overbroad 
 
Each of the laws analyzed above are unconstitutional on 
their face based solely on their overly vague, misleading clauses. 
However, in one of them HB 3557 in Texas there is an 
additional issue. Termed the above or below clause, it is notable not 
in its presence but in its absence. HB 3557, like HB 727 in 
Louisiana, lacks a proper definition of what makes a gas or oil 
pipeline into a critical infrastructure site protected by law. Both 
these bills both of which have been codified do not properly 
define whether these protected pipelines must be above or below-
ground. This results in both HB 3557 in Texas and HB 727 in 
Louisiana227 being overbroad and thus blatantly unconstitutional.  
Texas bill HB 3557 states:  
 
424.001. Def . I  h  cha e , c ca  
f a c e fac  ha  he ea g assigned by 
Section 423.0045(a)(1-a) and also includes:  
(1) any pipeline transporting oil or gas or the 
products or constituents of oil or gas; and 
 
226 Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33. 
227 One thing which must be noted about HB 727 is that it does not contain an 




(2) a facility or pipeline described by this section that 
is under construction and all equipment and 
appurtenances used during that construction . . .228  
 
Section 423.0045(a)(1-a)(B)(i)-( ) c de  a   f 
a  ab eg d [ c] , ga ,  che ca  e e   ts definition 
of critical infrastructure.229 However, the section also clearly states 
ha  e e   be e c ed b  a fe ce  he  h ca  ba e  
b  de g ed  e c de de ;  he  ca   be 
extant along the side of the road in order to be fully protected by the 
definition of a critical infrastructure site.230  
Section 424.001, as introduced in HB 3557, does not contain 
h  a f e . HB 3557 c de  a  e ine transporting oil or 
ga    def  f a c ca  f a ructure site, as well as a 
e e h ch  de  c c  a d e e  ece f e e  
which can be used during that construction.231 The use of the term 
a  e e  d e   c ea  d ffe e a e be ee  ab e- and 
below-ground lines. In fact, the construction of Section 424.001(1) 
seems to deliberately encompass both above-and below-ground 
pipelines, especially when read in conjunction with Section 
424.001(2) which extends that protection to any kind of equipment 
used to install the pipeline.232  
While the definition of critical infrastructure presents issues 
of vagueness and unconstitutionality outside of First Amendment 
doctrine it could be argued to be void for vagueness under Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment precedent233 it is also critical to note 
that this lack of definition unconstitutionally intrudes on free speech 
rights of individuals.  The state of Texas is currently home to more 
than 225,000 miles of pipelines, per the Texas Pipeline Awareness 
Alliance.234 Most of these pipes have been installed underground, 
 
228 H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2019) (emphasis added); H.B. 
3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (emphasis added). 
229 TEX. GOV T CODE § 423.0045(a)(1-a)(B) (2019). 
230 Id. 
231 H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2019); H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. 
Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019). 
232 Id. 
233 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Johnson v. United States, 
135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).  





and have few visible markers.235 Without adequate notice in-statute 
of whether below-ground pipelines constitute as critical 
infrastructure sites under HB 3557, anti-oil protestors anywhere in 
the state might be trespassing with the inten   a   e  
the function of the pipeline-- simply by standing on top of a manhole 
cover.236 Additionally, HB 3557 neglects to establish what amount 
f ace a d he e e  c de ed a  f he e e   
legal terms. Would standing near a pipeline constitute as trespassing 
on it? Would protesting ten feet from a pipeline count as trespass 
under the statute and thus result in criminal charges? Due to its lack 
of narrow application, HB 3557 intrudes on constitutionally 
protected free speech. It is too broad, and results in the potential 
criminalization of anyone who so much as trods on a sidewalk.    
HB 3557 is overbroad even without considering the above- 
and below-ground clause. By defining a pipeline as not only the 
completed pipeline itself, but also a pipeline during its 
construction c d g a  e e  a d a e a ce  ed 
d g ha  c c the state of Texas seeks to prevent any 
form of protest against the construction of new pipelines.237 This 
means that protests e h e a  Ma a Kea  Ha a , g g a  
of this writing, would result in criminalization and jail time.238 The 
allegory is not perfect the Mauna Kea protests are against the 
installation of a telescope on a holy site, not an oil pipeline beneath 
a reservoir but a group of Indigenous protestors blocking off a 
road to prevent access to trucks and bulldozers would certainly 
qualify as a state jail crime in Texas. 
  Much like the pipelines in Texas, most of the 125,000 miles 
of pipeline in the state of Louisiana are not clearly marked.239 
Pipelines are generally below-ground for convenience purposes, but 
this means that most of the general public have no clue where 
pipelines even gas and oil pipelines actually are. Like HB 3557, 
HB 727 in Louisiana, codified into law at R.S. 14:61 and 14:61.1, 
neglects to differentiate between above- and below-ground 
 
235 Id. 
236 See H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019). 
237 H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019). 
238 See Maui News, Thousand Take to The Streets to Protest TMT, MAUI NEWS 
(Aug. 10, 2019 5:17 PM), https://mauinow.com/2019/08/10/thousands-take-to-
the-streets-to-protest-tmt/ [https://perma.cc/76HU-9TB4]; see also TEX. PENAL 
CODE § 12.35(a) (2019). 




pipelines. The text of the law reads:   
 
61. Unauthorized entry of a critical infrastructure.  
B. For the purposes of this Section, the following 
words shall have the following meanings:  
(1) C ca  f a c e  ea  a  a d a  
structures, equipment, or other immovable or 
movable property located upon chemical 
manufacturing facilities, refineries, electrical power 
facilities . . . pipelines . . . or any site where the 
construction or improvement of any facility or 
structure referenced in this Section is occurring . . . 
(3) Pipeline means flow, transmission, distribution, 
or gathering lines, regardless of size or length, which 
transmit and transport oil, gas, petrochemicals, 
minerals or water in a solid, liquid, or gaseous 
state.240 
 
Stepping onto ground or a sidewalk which contains or covers a 
pipeline, knowingly or unknowingly, could at this point result in a 
guilty sentence of up to five years in prison, with or without labor, 
as well as monetary fines.241 In the free speech context, this lack of 
definition makes HB 727 and its accompanying amendments 
unconstitutionally overbroad, which is clearly prohibited by NAACP 
v. Button, Reno, and Hicks.242 This has already resulted in the arrest 
of at least six people in Louisiana, some of whom were protesting 
the installation of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline.243  
For this reason, both of these laws must be immediately 
repealed or rewritten to satisfy the requirement for narrow 
application.244 As they stand now, they intrude without appropriate 
cause into territory that is supposed to be protected by the First 
Amendment right of free speech.   
 
 
240 LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61(C) (2018). 
241 Id. 
242 Button, 371 U.S. at 415; ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844; Hicks, 539 U.S. at 113.  
243 Complaint, White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 23-24, (M.D. La., May 
22, 2019) (describing arrests that have occurred since HB 727 was enacted into 
law).  
244 539 U.S. at 113.  
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3. These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws 
Unconstitutionally Limit Free Speech and Freedom of 
Association for Legal Organizations in South Dakota 
and Oklahoma  
 
In addition to their vagueness and overbreadth, two of the 
six laws described above have an even more insidious impact on 
First Amendment rights. SB 189 in South Dakota and HB 1123 in 
Oklahoma unconstitutionally infringe on the freedom of association 
of both individuals and organizations. This constitutional freedom 
is enumerated in the First Amendment and protected by Supreme 
Court precedent; the subsections of each of the above bills and their 
accompanying codified statutes violates the U.S. Constitution and 
criminalizes personal and organizational support of Indigenous 
protest.  
As discussed in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the likelihood of 
whether certain speech may incite violence does not automatically 
remove that speech from the protection of the First Amendment.245 
The intent of the speaker, the likelihood of the speech resulting in 
violence, and/or the actual imminence of violence occurring because 
of the speech, must each be considered in determining whether that 
speech can be legally regulated.246 The South Dakotan riot boosting 
statute SB 189 amends does not describe actions which reach that 
level of regulation.   
SB 189, signed into law in March of this year, states that 
individuals or organizations can be held liable to the state of South 
Dakota if that person:  
 
[J]ointly and severally with any other person . . . the 
person:  
1) Participates in any riot and directs, advises, 
encourages, or solicits any other person participating 
in the riot to acts of force or violence; 
2) Does not personally participate in any riot but 
directs, advises, encourages, or solicits other persons 
participating in the riot to acts of force or violence, 
or; 
3) Upon the direction, advice, encouragement, or 
 




solicitation of any other person, uses force or 
violence, or makes any threat to use force or 
violence, if accompanied by immediate power of 
execution, by three or more persons, acting together 
and without authority of law . . . .247  
 
Aga , e  de  h  ac  c de    d d a , 
but non-profits, LLCs, corporations, partnerships, or any other 
group.248 It could even include a tribe under federal Indian law; the 
def  c de  a  g  ac g a  a  de   e a  
def , a d h h  ee a  dge  c d e e  a g   
a  ea  a be  h d hat group be involved in setting up a 
protest.  
At this point, without further narrowing of the definition, it 
is impossible to say whether the law could be used to attack 
Indigenous tribes and groups for protesting the installation of gas or 
oil pipelines on or near tribal jurisdiction. What is certain is that this 
liability extends to anyone who provides any kind of advice or 
e c age e   d d a  a c a g  a  ( h ee  e 
persons committing or threatening to commit acts of violence), 
regardless of whether that person is in the state of South Dakota.249 
Justifiably, organizations which supported the Standing Rock 
protestors now fear that they can be held liable for the actions of 
individuals in another state regardless of whether those 
individuals have actually rioted, or have merely been exercising 
their constitutional right to free speech and assembly.  
SB 189 also has the distinct characteristic of lacking any 
kind of required intent to commit an unlawful act in any part of the 
behavior it criminalizes.250 There is no mens rea in the statute, and 
thus no way to analyze the intent of the individual or organization 
charged with riot boosting. By neglecting to provide a required 
intent in-statute, South Dakota has criminalized the freedom of 
individuals and organizations to associate with other individuals or 
organizations, either in or out of the state. A simple conversation 
 
247 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb.., § 2(1)-(3) (S.D. 2019) (emphasis 
added).S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 2(1)-(3) (S.D. 2018) 
(emphasis added). 
248 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb.., § 1(2) (S.D. 2019).S.B. 189, 94th Sess., 
Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 1(2) (S.D. 2018). 
249 Id. 
250 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2019).S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. 
Assemb. 2019 (S.D. 2018).  
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might result in the attribution of criminal charges to a person or 
organization that had no intent to commit any sort of unlawful act, 
and which has never even once been in South Dakota.  
Unlike what is required by Supreme Court precedent in 
Brandenburg, SB 189 does not consider the intent of the speaker, 
the likelihood of violence resulting from the speech, or the 
likelihood of violence actually occurring in examining riot 
boosting.251 Any protest can become a riot given the right triggers, 
but that does not necessarily mean what people say or do on social 
media will force it to occur.252 Criminalizing people who are not 
even in the state for encouraging or advising people involved in a 
massive protest does not follow the terms set forth in 
Brandenburg.253 By analyzing the speech not only of those people 
involved in a protest, but those advising or encouraging from the 
sidelines (or from the other side of the world), SB 189 not only 
violates the constitutional protection of free speech, but also the 
constitutional right of freedom of association.254  
SB 189 a , a  h a g, a e  a  ga a  gh  
to freedom of association by overtly criminalizing the interaction 
between an individual and an organization within the context of a 
lawful protest. The Supreme Court states in NAACP v. Alabama that 
[e]ffec e ad cac  f b h b c a d a e  f e , 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group 
a c a . 255 Similarly, in Kusper v. Pontikes, the Supreme Court 
declared ha  a g f ca  e c ach e   a c a a  
freedom cannot be justified upon a mere showing of a legitimate 
a e e e . 256  Whether a person chooses to associate with an 
organization or political party is entirely their own affair, and that 
right to choose is protected by both the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. As per NAACP v. Button, the actions of a legal or 
litigative organization cannot be limited by a state law which 
f ge   a  ga a  f eed   a c a e h d d a  
 
251 Id.; 395 U.S. at 446, 449. 
252  Complaint, Dakota Rural Action et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., at 16, (W.D. 
S.D., Mar. 28, 2019). 
253 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2019); 395 U.S. at 446, 449.S.B. 
189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019 (S.D. 2018); 395 U.S. at 446, 449. 
254 U.S. CONST. amend. I; S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2019). U.S. 
CONST. amend. I; S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019 (S.D. 2018). 
255 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).  
256 414 U.S. at 59.  
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who may need their services.257 I d g  a  ga a  
freedom of association via overbroad or overly vague language is 
unconstitutional, particularly regarding issues that involve 
litigation.258 
SB 189 impugns the right of legal organizations to freedom 
of association by criminalizing the solicitation of an individual by 
a  ga a   e f ce  e ce,  [ a e] a  h ea  to use 
f ce  e ce. 259 While this sounds positive, in a protest 
a , a e e  f ha  a  e f ce e  c de  e ce  
a  be h g e ha  a e  cha  ( .e. f c  ICE,  chinga 
la migra,  d  T ,  he , he , h , h , Ka a a gh has got to 
g ). I  he e  c e , f ce a   a   ac a  be 
extant and as noted in Brandenburg, even statements which may 
appear to advocate the use of force or violence frequently lack the 
requisite intent.260 Regardless, the criminalization of solicitation of 
words or actions in a protest context is almost a direct mirror to the 
kind of legal obfuscation found in NAACP v. Button, which the 
Supreme Court ruled to unconstitutionally violate the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.261  
Unlike South Dakota, Oklahoma does not expressly impute 
liability to organizations or individuals who did not actively 
participate in a protest. However, HB 1123 does have a clause which 
states:  
 
C. If an organization is found to be a conspirator with 
persons who are found to have committed any of the 
crimes described in subsection A or B of this section, 
the conspiring organization shall be punished by a 
fine that is ten times the amount of said fine 
authorized by the appropriate provision of this 
section.262 
 
Subsection A of HB 1123 states that any person who willfully 
trespasses or enters a critical infrastructure facility shall be fined no 
 
257 521 U.S. at 844. 
258 Id.  
259 Id.; S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019 (S.D. 2019). 
260 395 U.S. at 449. 
261 521 U.S. AT 844: U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV.  
262 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § C (Okla. 2017). 
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less than a thousand dollars, jailed for up to six months, or both.263 
If that person is found to have meant to damage or tamper with 
equipment or impede the function of the facility, then they can be 
fined up to ten thousand dollars and imprisoned for up to a year.264 
Section B decrees that any person who damages or tampers with 
equipment shall be fined a hundred thousand dollars, imprisoned for 
not more than ten years, or both.265  
This obviously presents problems for any organization that 
 f d  ha e bee  a c a  h a  d d a  h , de  
S b ec  A f HB 1123,  f d  ha e eded  h b ed  
the functions of a critical infrastructure facility.266 The fines and jail 
time can come to a total of ten thousand dollars meaning that for 
an organization found to have conspired with a protestor, the 
monetary consequences can be up to a hundred thousand dollars, 
which few non-profit or legal aid organizations can afford. If the 
protestor has actually done any damage to the site, the fine could be 
ten times that.267 Depending on which section the individual has 
been charged with, this can result in up to a million dollar fine 
g ed  a  ga a  f d  ha e c ed  h ha  
individual. For organizations such as the Indigenous Environmental 
Network, Water Protector Legal Collective, and others, this could 
mean hefty if not impossible fines owed to South Dakota and all 
for something that should not even be attributed to them in the first 
place.  
 
A  f 2019, O ah a a e def e  c g  a :  
First, an agreement by two or more persons, 
Second, to commit [the Crime or Conduct Charged]. 
Third, the defendant(s) (was/were [a] part[ies] to the 
agreement at the time it was made)/(knowingly 
became [a] party(ies) to the agreement at some time 
after it was made. 
Fourth, an overt act by one or more of the parties 
performed subsequent to the formation of the 
 
263 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § A (Okla. 2017). 
264 Id. 
265 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § B (Okla. 2017). 
266 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § A (Okla. 2017). 





Under this framework, it would be simple to find an organization 
guilty of conspiracy to organize a protest that, through the intentions 
of no one involved, devolved into a riot. NAACP v. Button clearly 
illustrates that legal organizations, particularly those involved in 
litigation, are allowed to associate with individuals that may wind 
up requiring legal services from them in the future.269 If the NAACP 
could actively recommend the use of legal aid organizations via 
speaking with those who have had their constitutional rights 
violated, then the Indigenous Environmental Network can speak to 
Indigenous protestors regarding the destruction of the environment 
on their reservations. HB 1123, however, creates million-dollar 
consequences.  
O ah a  a e ha  been described as one that is meant 
 ca e ff  -profits and legal organizations that intend to aid 
legal protestors against pipelines. A city attorney in Oklahoma City 
be e e   a  a ed  da e a d h ea e  a  ga a  
that might organize a nonviolent, non-disruptive political 
e . 270 Proof beyond theories is difficult. However, in the wake 
of Standing Rock and the many thousands of people, individually 
and in groups, who provided aid to Indigenous and non-indigenous 
protestors at the camps, the reason why such a clause might be 
written into a critical infrastructure statute begins to emerge.  
SB 189 and HB 1123 create criminal and financial penalties 
for individuals and organizations which choose to associate with or 
even speak to d d a  f d  ha e bee   b g   
trespassing on critical infrastructure property in their states. In the 
case of SB 189, individuals and organizations need not even be in-
state for the penalties to be levied against them. This is not only a 
clear violation of First Amendment precedent against vague and 
overbroad language in the policing of free speech, but also of the 
F  a d F ee h A e d e  c b ed ec  f he 
right of freedom of association.271 As per Reno and Hicks, the only 
 
268 Okla. Unif. Jury Instr. CR 2-17 (quoted in United States v. Wartson, 772 Fed. 
Appx. 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2019)).  
269 Button, 371 U.S. at 429.  
270 Staff, In wake of environmental protests, legislation aims to protect critical 
infrastructure 2017, GEO. UNIV.: THE FREE SPEECH PROJECT (Aug. 22, 2017, 
12:00AM) http://freespeechproject.georgetown.domains/state-and-local-
government/oklahoma-house-bill-1123/. 
271 U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV. 
111 
 
solution for both South Dakota and Oklahoma is to suspend 
enforcement of these laws and invalidate the subsections which 
overtly criminalize free speech and freedom of association.272 
Without doing so, they run the risk of violating the First Amendment 
rights of not only citizens of their own states, but of citizens all over 
the U.S.  
 
4. The Protections of the First Amendment in These 
Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws are 
Insufficient to Make Them Constitutional 
 
Perhaps to their credit, two of the six laws examined above 
include subsections nominally meant to protect the First 
Amendment rights of assembly, free speech, and protest. 
Specifically, SB 2044 in North Dakota and HB 727 in Louisiana 
de be a e  c c  ace f  a f  a e b  a d peaceful and 
de  e  h  he c c  f he a e .273 If taken 
at face-value, these subsections may be used to protect protestors, 
especially Indigenous protestors, from unfair targeting and 
criminalization by state governments. However, the 
unconstitutional breadth and vagueness of each of these statutes 
render these supposed protections completely toothless. Even if they 
facially include constitutional protections, the impact of both these 
laws results in the unconstitutional violation of the First 
Amendment, rendering their supposedly enumerated protections 
entirely pointless.   
The text of SB 2044 in North Dakota reads,  
 
This section may not be construed to prevent or 
prohibit lawful assembly and peaceful and orderly 
petition for the redress of grievances, including a 
labor dispute between an employer and its 
employee.274  
 
Similarly, HB 727 has a subsection which reads:  
 
D. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to apply 
 
272 521 U.S. at 844; 539 U.S. at 113. 
273 S.B. 2044, 66th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019); H.B. 727, 2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (La. 2018). 
274 S.B. 2044, 66th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019). 
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to or prevent the following:  
(1) Lawful assembly and peaceful and orderly 
petition, picketing, or demonstration for the redress 
of grievances or to express ideas and views regarding 
legitimate matters of public interest, including any 
labor dispute between any employer and its 
employee or position protected by the United States 
Constitution or the Constitution of Louisiana.275  
 
While these subsections appear to protect First Amendment rights 
of rights of assembly, free speech, and protest, when read in 
conjunction with the rest of the associated laws, these protections 
lack any kind of bite. It is impossible to protect the dearly loved 
liberties of free speech and freedom of assembly while 
simultaneously constructing statutes in a manner that is so vague 
and overbroad that regular behavior becomes criminalized. It is 
simply unconstitutional to enact criminal penalties for online 
retweets, encouraging texts, standing beside an unmarked pipeline 
with a protest sign, or accepting fiduciary support of protestors from 
organizations such as EarthJustice, the Sierra Club, or the ACLU.276 
The two concepts of free speech and speech restriction do not and 
cannot line up.  
SB 2044 explicitly states in a subsection that it cannot be 
used to prevent peaceful and orderly protest.277 Simultaneously, 
however, the construction of the remainder of the statute is so vague 
and overbroad that it could ensure the devastation of a right to 
peaceful protest.278 The impeding or impairing clause in SB 2044 
means that any person who does anything that could make any kind 
of trouble for those installing or monitoring a pipeline could be 
charged with criminal trespass.279 Providing a subsection in-statute 
claiming to offer an opportunity for people to exercise their right to 
free speech while concurrently ensnaring anyone who comes 
anywhere near a critical infrastructure facility to exercise their right 
 
275 H.B. 727, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018). 
276 See id.; see also Jonathan Parks-Ramage, Tr mp s An i-Environment Agenda 
Makes 2018 the Perfect Time to Support These Climate Orgs, VICE (Mar. 6, 
2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/437mpq/trumps-anti-
environment-agenda-makes-2018-the-perfect-time-to-support-these-climate-orgs 
[https://perma.cc/K45S-5QVP].  
277 See S.B. 2044, 66th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019). 
278 See id. 
279 See id.  
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to free speech is both an absurd logical fallacy and blatantly 
unconstitutional.  
HB 727 is another example of this conundrum. While HB 
727 pays lip service to the notion of protecting First Amendment 
free speech rights, it is simultaneously being used and was 
designed to be used as a tool against the First Amendment. 
Implementation of HB 727 has already prevented those individuals 
who choose to protest the installation of oil pipelines from 
exercising their right to free speech by criminalizing their actions as 
the endangerment of critical infrastructure.280 HB 727 attempts to 
pay some kind of false homage to the First Amendment by 
specifically carving ou  ace f  a f  a e b  a d eacef  a d 
de  e ,  b  he fac  e a  ha   ha   bee  a ed  
a way that protects those rights.281 Within a week of HB 727 being 
put into effect, Indigenous protestor Anna White Hat, teacher and 
activist Ramon Mejía, and journalist Karen Savage, had been 
arrested for standing not on--but near the pipeline.282 White Hat was 
a e ed af e  ead g a a e  ce e  f  -violent protest 
aga  a d g f he e e ec   he A chafa a a 
Basin.283 This occurred even though White Hat and her fellow 
e  e e a d g  e dea g  be  b c a e a  
a d/  e  he e he  had a h a   be,  a d   
private land.284 At the time, the Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC was 
illegally clearing and constructing on land they did not have 
permission to enter.285 A  he e a   ega  gh  f a   
e e ce, a d he ef e  c ca  f a c e,  Wh e Ha  a d 
others were arrested for simply standing near or observing a pipeline 
that was being illegally constructed. Due to raising their voices in 
opposition to the pipeline, White Hat and her comrades were 
arrested by state and local law enforcement officers that had been 
hired by the Bayou Bridge Pipeline LLC to act as security.286  
Both White Hat and Savage currently face up to ten years in 
 
280 Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 7-8, (M.D. La., May 
22, 2019).  
281 H.B. 727, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018). 
282 Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 7-8, (M.D. La., May 
22, 2019).  
283 Id. at 7. 
284 Id. at 21.  
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 23, 26. 
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prison and at least $2000 in fines.287 All three of them Anna White 
Hat, Ramon Mejía, and Karen Savage were exercising their First 
Amendment rights at the time of their arrest. The subsection in HB 
727 meant to protect free speech was ineffective against the vague 
and overbroad clauses present in the rest of the statute.  
While the state legislatures in North Dakota and Louisiana 
attempt to hide the blatant unconstitutionality of their critical 
infrastructure laws behind protective clauses, the reality is that both 
these laws lack the sort of teeth that could provide any real defense. 
As noted in previous sections, these laws are both so vague and so 
overbroad that it would be impossible to truly differentiate 
constitutionally protected free speech and protest from any kind of 
criminal trespass or violation of the statutes.288 Enforcement of these 
laws must be suspended, as per Reno, and the vague and overbroad 
clauses in each of these statutes must, as per Hicks, be limited or 
invalidated in order to provide true and valid protections of First 
Amendment rights in both North Dakota and Louisiana.289 
Similarly, once the unconstitutional clauses are severed, sections 
which protect the First Amendment must also be added to each of 
the other statutes examined above to fully provide protection for 
those protesting oil and gas pipeline installation across the United 
States.  
 
These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws Fulfill A Long 
Tradition of the Chilling of the Free Speech and Civil Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples  
 
Holistically, all six of these laws HB 1123 in Oklahoma; 
SB 2044 in North Dakota; SB 189 in South Dakota, HB 3557 in 
Texas; HB 727 in Louisiana, and the Pipelines Act put forward by 
state and federal governments are unconstitutional for a variety of 
reasons. Either they are too vague to properly limit free speech, they 
are so overbroad as to criminalize free speech and association, or 
they are unconstitutionally limiting the use of free speech and 
freedom of association. Historically, the Supreme Court has closely 
analyzed restrictions on free speech and freedom of association, and 
Supreme Court precedent makes each of the laws above 
 
287 Id. 
288 See infra Part IV.A.1-3. 
289 ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844; Hicks, 539 U.S. at 113. 
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unconstitutional. However, each of these laws also play into a 
longstanding tradition in the United States of limiting or chilling the 
civil rights of Indigenous peoples in the U.S.  
At first glance, the described laws do not actively target 
Indigenous peoples. However, the rhetoric around each of these 
laws plays into stereotypes which have previously been evident in 
lawmaking trends such as assimilation and termination. In 
Oklahoma, the sponsor of HB 1123, Representative Scott Biggs, 
openly admitted that the law had been developed to prevent any 
protest similar to the one that occurred at Standing Rock from ever 
happening in the state of Oklahoma.290 While developing the bill in 
conjunction with the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Association, Rep. Scott 
stated  he H e f  ha  [ ]he e a e a  f h g   
O ah a gh   ha  a e d a g he a e  f bad ac ,  
meaning Indigenous and environmental  activists.291 He also 
claimed that protests such as the one in Standing Rock were 
e  a d disruptive, and that it was important to pass HB 1123 
in order to prevent similar things from happening in the state of 
Oklahoma.292  
During testimony before the South Dakota legislature in 
 f HB 1123, G e  N e  bb  e f ed ha  a 
catalyst for the Act was the fact that some of the people who 
participated in the protest at Standing Rock in North Dakota were 
fe a  e  f  he  a  f he c .293 
S a ,  L a a, LMOGA  P e de  a d Ge e a  C e , 
T e  G a , h  d af ed HB 727, a ed ha  he f ed  
O ah a  e , a g h he O ah a O  a d Ga  
Association, adapting their approach to the existing critical 
infrastructu e a   L a a. 294 ALEC  d af ed c ca  
infrastructure bill closely mirrors the Oklahoma statute as well, and 
 
290 Joe Wertz, Oklahoma Bill To Pro ec  Cri ical Infras r c re  Co ld C rb 
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shares many of the clauses that were developed in response to those 
e  bad ac  de c bed b  Re . B gg .295 Notably, in 
Texas, the authors of HB 3557 attended ALEC conferences within 
the past few years; multiple oil companies in Texas, including the 
Texas Oil and Gas Association, the Texas Pipeline Association, 
ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, and Enbridge also supported the 
bill.296 State legislators are cooperating with oil companies over the 
First Amendment rights of the residents of their state.  
Each of these statements on its own, while troublesome, do 
not engender much cause for concern. However, when viewed in the 
context of federal and state legislation against Indigenous peoples 
throughout American history, these claims take on a new and 
uncomfortable implication. The history of suppression of 
Indigenous protest in the United States, both before and after the 
enshrinement of Indigenous civil rights via the Indian Citizenship 
Act, were characterized with similar language. The descriptions of 
e ce  e  a  age f I d ge  e e  h ch ha  
existed for centuries. Critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws imply 
the existence of a battle between backwards- g, c ed  
Indigenous peoples and forward- g, c ed   a d ga  
companies, with the government pushing for Indigenous 
assimilation to the motives of state legislatures and their 
accompanying oil and gas lobbyists.297 Historically, when 
Indigenous people fought back, they were killed, but as the 
relocation era ended and allotment began, the punishment changed 
instead to denial.298  Indigenous people could not use their own 
languages, exercise their own cultures, or live in their own historical 
 
295 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., Protecting Our 
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019: Section-by-
Section Analysis and Legislative Text, (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/news/71476/2019-
pipeline-safety-reauthorization_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HVC-N3VS]; 
Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019: 
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS 
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297 See The Dawes Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed).  
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homelands.299 These critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws and the 
rhetoric behind them, harken back to an era when Indigenous 
e e  e e de c bed a  ch d h  b  a e a d fede a  
governments, and their territories were cut up into allotments and 
sold off to outside peoples.300 The upsurge of critical 
infrastructure/anti-protest law echoes a time when the organizations 
AIM and WARN pushed back against federal and state policies 
which kept Indigenous peoples in poverty.301 Even during the rise 
of Red Power, hundreds of Indigenous peoples were being arrested 
and charged with criminal actions. The occupation of Wounded 
Knee alone resulted in more than a thousand arrests and at least 275 
criminal charges though admittedly there were violent clashes 
between AIM activists and law enforcement prior to the end of the 
occupation.302 Now, in an administration which has removed any 
mention of climate change from government websites and 
constantly and consistently rolls back environmental protection laws 
in favor of fossil fuel and fracking companies, the U.S. is gearing up 
for another massive fight not just over the environment, but over 
the civil rights of Indigenous peoples.303  
Indigenous peoples have used their First Amendment right 
to religious freedoms to carve out space for Indigenous religious and 
spiritual practices across the U.S. Now, through the use of mass 
protest, Indigenous peoples are utilizing their First Amendment 
rights of free speech and freedom of association to demand 
indigenized environmental justice, and state and federal legislatures 
have taken notice. By crafting laws which violate the First 
Amendment rights not only of Indigenous activists, but journalists 
and other protestors, each of these states and the federal government 
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continue to perpetuate the chilling of Indigenous free speech and 
Indigenous civil rights. This repackaged attitude towards 
Indigenous peoples, particularly Indigenous peoples acting in the 
political sphere, has reaped the same old consequences.  
The withholding of civil rights protections from Indigenous 
peoples has been essentially the norm for much of U.S. history. 
Indigenous peoples were subjected to colonization, genocide, 
termination, and assimilation. Indigenous children have been denied 
their culture, history, land, sacred sites, and native languages. Now, 
state and federal lawmakers are attempting to chill Indigenous 
e e  gh   f ee eech a d f eed  f a c a . The 
restriction of Indigenous First Amendment Rights is just another 
step in a long road of repressing Indigenous civil rights one that 
must be reversed as soon as possible.  
 
These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws Have a 
Disparate Impact on Indigenous Peoples  
 
Indigenous people are, have been, and will continue to be 
leaders in the anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist environmental justice 
movement. From the Keweenaw Bay Band Chippewa and Yakama 
Nation of the Pacific Northwest, to the Indigenous women of 
WARN who founded the Camp of Sacred Stones, Indigenous 
peoples have driven the environmental justice movement to new 
heights and demanded the defense and preservation of the 
environment for future generations.304 This means that there have 
been, are, and will continue to be extensive conflict between 
Indigenous peoples of the United States and the U.S. government 
both at the federal and state levels.  
Indigenous peoples have already borne state and federal 
retaliation against anti-capitalist environmental justice movements. 
More than four hundred people were arrested at Standing Rock.305 
Not all of them were Indigenous, but a great number of them were, 
and the few remaining in federal prison or under supervision with 
 
304 See GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 116-17; see WILKINSON, supra note 
76, at 165. 
305 Colin Moynihan, A Murky Legal Mess at Standing Rock, THE NEW YORKER 




criminal charges certainly are.306 Anna White Hat may be sentenced 
to up to ten years in prison for taking photos of illegal pipeline 
construction.307 It cannot and should not be said that any of these 
laws were written to deliberately discriminate against Indigenous 
peoples. The construction of the laws themselves would indicate that 
they were not. Even if they were developed in response to the 
#NoDAPL protests at Standing Rock, the laws were constructed to 
criminalize as many people as possible for protesting gas and oil 
pipelines. However, the impact of these laws will have a disparate 
impact on Indigenous peoples, rendering them unconstitutional in 
their application and thus illegal under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Trump administration continues 
to push for the commercialization of public and tribal lands it is 
likely that that disparate impact will grow.  
Precedent set in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) and extending 
on throughout past decades have determined that laws which are 
race-neutral upon their face but are racially biased in application are 
unconstitutional.308 There is no space and no proper place in this 
paper for a full Fourteenth Amendment racial bias analysis. Without 
going further into the issue, it is clear that there is a risk of these 
critical infrastructure laws having a disparate impact on Indigenous 
peoples.309 The critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws discussed 
have been constructed to ensnare those attempting to exercise their 
First Amendment right to free speech and protest, but as the 
Indigenous environmental justice movement progresses, the 
likelihood of Indigenous individuals being criminalized is high. 
Indeed, Indigenous peoples around the world including the United 
States stand at the forefront of the battle against the ongoing 
climate crisis. Gilio-Whitaker provides an essential description:  
 
Indigenous peoples worldwide became more visible 
as it became apparent that they, along with more 
vulnerable peoples in the undeveloped, Indigenous, 
and fourth world, were on the frontlines of climate 
 
306 Water Protector Prisoners, Water Protector Legal Collective, 
https://waterprotectorlegal.org/water-protector-prisoners/. 
307 Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 23, 26, (M.D. La., 
May 22, 2019).Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., Case No. 
3:19-cv-00322, *23, *26 (M.D. La., May 22, 2019). 
308 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).  
309 See infra Part IV. 
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change, even though they had been excluded from 
international processes like the Kyoto Protocol. 
Grassroots movements and organizations emerged 
from Indigenous communities all over the world, 
bringing attention to the effects climate change, the 
fossil fuel industry, and government collusion were 
having on their communities.310  
 
Due to the combination of environmental racism and 
colonialism, Indigenous peoples have been pushed into the position 
of being the first responders in the climate crisis. The blend of 
historical sidelining, colonialist expansion, and environmental 
racism ensure that any laws constructed to combat any free speech 
response to that climate crisis will by necessity have a disparate 
impact on Indigenous communities.311  
  
VI. THOSE LAWS THAT AFFECT YOU AFFECTED US FIRST 312: 
HOW SILENCING ONE SILENCES ALL 
 
The Dakota Access Pipeline arcs through North and South 
Dakota and Iowa before coming to a stop in Illinois. The Keystone 
XL pipeline, owned by TransCanada, begins near the border 
between Alberta and Saskatchewan in Canada, gashing through 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma, 
before coming to a stop in Port Arthur, Texas. An awkward tail of 
the Keystone XL angles off from Nebraska at Steele City, crosses 
through Missouri, and ends in Illinois. Pipelines crisscross all over 
the United States; whether they are above- or below-ground, they 
are critical in many ways to the day-to-day function of the country. 
Even as the climate crisis worsens, the water, oil, gas, petroleum, 
and other chemicals that are transported every day via these 
pipelines are critical to keep society running smoothly.  
At the time of this writing, more than thirty states in the U.S. 
have drafted and proposed anti-protest bills.313 Of those thirty states, 
 
310 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 118-19. 
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eight states enacted critical infrastructure laws.314 Three more 
critical infrastructure/anti-protest bills are pending in Ohio, 
Missouri, and Illinois.315 As more states craft critical 
infrastructure/anti-protest bills, more people will be arrested, 
charged, and convicted under unconstitutional legislation. Further 
development of critical infrastructure legislation in its current form 
would likely continue the trend of unconstitutionally infringing on 
First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association 
should people continue to protest the installation of pipelines, 
fracking, or other projects involving dangerous fossil fuels.  
Wh e O ah a  HB 1123, N h Da a  SB 2044, 
S h Da a  SB 189, Te a  HB 3557, L a a  HB 727, a d 
the federal Pipelines Act unconstitutionally target Indigenous 
peoples in their application, those same laws are facially 
nondiscriminatory. To be clear: all six of the laws analyzed in this 
paper are written in a way that chills not only the free speech of 
Indigenous activists, but of any activist. While they are currently 
being applied most strictly to Indigenous activists, and were created 
in response to Indigenous environmental activism, they have already 
been applied to both Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. Karen 
Savage, a non-indigenous journalist, was arrested at the same time 
as Anna White Hat.316 So was Ramon Mejía, a social studies teacher 
in Biloxi, Mississipi who also protested the Bayou Bridge 
Pipeline.317 Hundreds of people were arrested at Standing Rock, 
Indigenous and non-indigenous alike. As described by Gilio-
Whitaker: 
 
The #NoDAPL protest at Standing Rock was 
precedent setting on numerous fronts, not the least of 
which for the degree of collaboration between Native 
and non-Native people it inspired. For the better part 
of a year, non-Native Americans poured out their 
support in social and news media, with financial and 
other donations . . . and side by side risked their lives 




316 Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 8, (M.D. La., May 
22, 2019). Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., Case No. 3:19-
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harassment, and jail.318   
 
Since Standing Rock, and as the climate crisis worsens, more 
and more people have been protesting against pipelines and for 
environmental justice. As environmental justice continues to be 
indigenized, environmental racism continues to be challenged, and 
critical infrastructure sites continue to be picketed, people from all 
demographics will be swept under the application of these 
unconstitutional laws. Combating the climate crisis through the 
courts will continue to foster opportunities for free speech actions. 
The highly anticipated case of Juliana et al. v. United States et al., 
which argues that the U.S. government has long been aware of the 
danger to the public from fossil fuels and carbon dioxide pollution, 
could have vast consequences for the future of environmental law 
and safety in the U.S. It could quite particularly have an impact on 
Indigenous environmental justice, as one of the main cores of 
Juliana  a g e   ha  [ he U.S. g e e ] ec e  
allow[s] interstate and international transpo  f f  f e  de e 
the danger it presents to the world.319 However, as Juliana sits in the 
Ninth Circuit, state and federal legislators continue to wield the oil 
industry as a weapon against constitutional rights.320  
Each of the laws discussed in this paper were developed 
deliberately in response to the #NoDAPL protests at Standing Rock. 
Standing Rock a groundbreaking protest not only due to the 
massive blend of Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples protesting 
at the site, but also due to the sheer number of Indigenous 
communities that served as Water Protectors was a watershed 
moment in the history of the United States.321 As the climate crisis 
worsens and more and more states propose and pass laws which 
criminalize free speech and protest, that kind of mass political action 
will likely repeat itself. The risk that is presented by the chilling of 
Indigenous free speech cannot be overstated. While it has been made 
clear that these critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws are targeted, 
 
318 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 110.  
319 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Kelsey 
Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. The United States of America et al., at 62, (D. 
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not in writing but in practice, at Indigenous peoples and Indigenous 
activists, the consequences of these laws are absolute. When the 
ce  f e g  a e e ced, he  a d  f , a  he f  
a ge  f g e e  e e   e e  he a . 322  
 
VII. MOVING FORWARD: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Supreme Court precedent is clear. The only solution to 
the unconstitutionality of these critical infrastructure/anti-protest 
laws is to suspend enforcement of them until each clause is analyzed 
and the unconstitutionally overbroad or overly vague clauses are 
severed from the statutes.323 Similarly, both state and federal 
lawmakers must be careful to prevent the use of such vague and 
overbroad clauses in future. The risk to the First Amendment is too 
great for laws like the ones described in this paper to remain as they 
are.  
However, the suspension and clause-severing required by 
Reno and Hicks will only resolve one issue presented by these laws 
when they are examined in their overall context. Each of these six 
laws infringe upon the First Amendment rights of Indigenous 
peoples in the United States, but in so doing they, and the 
legislatures that created them, continue a tradition of repressing 
Indigenous tribes.324 The framework used by state and federal 
governments in the U.S. is one which subjugates Indigenous peoples 
and denies them access to their civil and human rights.325 If that 
framework is not changed, those governments will continue to enact 
laws which repress Indigenous peoples. The framework must be 
rebuilt, and the structure is already available.  
One of the premiere documents regarding the rights (both 
international and civil) of Indigenous peoples has been UNDRIP.326 
The United States has yet to ratify this declaration, even if it has 
endorsed it.327 However, Articles 2, 18, and 32 clearly carve out 
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space for the U.S. to reshape its current jurisprudence, on both the 
state and federal level, to end judicial violation of Indigenous civil 
rights. These Articles state: 
 
Article 2.  
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and 
equal to all other peoples and individuals and have 
the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, 
in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based 
on their indigenous origin and identity . . . .   
Article 18.  
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in 
decision-making in matters which would affect their 
rights, through representatives chosen by themselves 
in accordance with their own procedures, as well as 
to maintain and develop their own indigenous 
decision-making institutions . . . . 
Article 19.  
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with 
the indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain their 
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and 
implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them . . .  
Article 32.  
1 Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and 
develop priorities and strategies for the development 
or use of their lands or territories or other resources.  
2 States shall consult and cooperate in good faith 
with the indigenous peoples concerned through their 
own representative institutions in order to obtain 
their free and informed consent prior to the approval 
of any project affecting their lands or territories and 
other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, 
water or other resources.  
3 States shall provide effective mechanism for just 






appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate 
adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or 
spiritual impact.328  
 
At the time of this writing, the U.S. has not ratified UNDRIP 
into enforceable law. Doing so would require an action by the 
Senate, which in the current climate seems unlikely.329 However, 
should these concepts be folded into U.S. law, laws which would 
negatively impact Indigenous rights, particularly those laws that 
impact their land or resources, could not be developed.330 It would 
enable, instead, the development of laws that both acknowledge 
Indigenous civil and human rights and prevent the violation of 




The history of stifling Indigenous rights in the United States 
is, effectively, the history of the United States. The conquering and 
systematic, genocidal destruction of the many thousands of 
Indigenous communities across North America has been termed 
he I d a  a ,  f ed h gh Ma fe  De ,  a d 
continued on in policies of boarding school indoctrination, 
allotments, and termination. In the current decades, Indigenous 
activism has pushed forward every aspect of the environmental 
justice movement and has forced it to confront its own imperialistic 
and capitalistic roots. It has also resulted in some of the greatest 
moments of free speech and protest of this generation, with the 
actions by Water Protectors at Standing Rock, Line 5 in Michigan, 
the Bayou Bridge in Louisiana, and many other places. As a result, 
state and federal legislatures and agencies have begun pushing 
unconstitutional agendas of their own, which not only have the 
impact of chilling free speech and freedom of association for 
political advocates and agencies, but particularly pointedly of 
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Indigenous peoples. These laws are unconstitutional both on their 
face and in their application. They violate the First Amendment by 
chilling the rights of free speech and of association and violate the 
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by denying U.S. citizens the liberty to associate with 
those they choose. Critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws target 
Indigenous peoples through their application and continue in a long 
tradition of the stifling or outright robbery of the civil and human 
rights of Indigenous peoples in the United States. If these laws 
continue, it will not just be Indigenous people that are impacted by 
these laws. In fact, these laws are already impacting non-Indigenous 
people; hundreds of people were arrested at the #NoDAPL protests 
at Standing Rock, not all of them Indigenous.331 As these laws 
expand, more and more people will be arrested for exercising their 
constitutional rights. Without protections, it could soon be the entire 
Indigenous environmental rights movement caught up in the 
crossfire.  
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